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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 29, 2009, the American Bar Association sent the following email
to its attorney mailing list:
Dear Colleague,
Thanks to everyone who has already responded to an important ABA survey regard-
ing potential membership packages (see below).  If you have responded, please disre-
gard this email.
If you haven’t yet responded, your input is very important and we hope you will
take the time to share your opinions.  Remember, there’s a drawing for one of ten
$150 American Express gift card prizes as well as a Grand Prize of one $1000
American Express gift card as a “thank you” for your participation.  The study
will remain open through FRIDAY, JULY 31.  You can access the survey by clicking
on the link below.
Thank you very much for your time.
. . .
No purchase necessary to enter.  Purchase of any ABA product, sevice [sic] or mem-
bership will not improve an entrant’s chances of winning.  To be eligible, you must
be a licensed U.S. attorney.
If this were a letter sent out in the ABA’s founding year of 1878, the
association would certainly have violated the lottery laws of virtually every
state then in the Nation.1  But so would the fast food or retail promotions, such
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1 See, e.g., Cross v. People, 32 P. 821, 822 (Colo. 1893) (“The gratuitous distribution of
property by lot or chance, if not resorted to as a device to evade the law, and no considera-
tion is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, does not constitute
the offense.  In such case the party receiving the chance is not induced to hazard money with
1
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as the McDonald’s Monopoly Game, which have become staples of American
life.2  Common among these retail promotions, a person may receive randomly
distributed game pieces with hidden printed symbols by purchasing hamburgers
or soft drinks.  These game pieces, either by themselves or in combination with
other game pieces, could entitle the purchaser to win a valuable prize.  Such
promotions are a type of “prize gaming.”3
The three basic forms of prize gaming are gambling, sweepstakes, and
contests.4  Most states have a common approach to determining the legality of
prize gaming.  In general, states analyze if an activity includes three factors
associated with gambling: (1) opportunity to win a prize, (2) winning based on
chance, and (3) consideration paid to take that chance.5  If you take away any
one of the three elements of gambling—consideration, prize, or chance—you
have an activity that is lawful in most states.6  A contest, for example, differs
from gambling because the winner is determined by skill.7  Determination of
whether a (pay-for-play) skill game (with prizes) is a permitted game as
opposed to a prohibited game (of chance) is based on the relative degrees of
skill and chance present in the game.8  In most states, if skill is the predominant
factor in determining a winner, the game is lawful.9
“[S]weepstakes always contain the elements of chance and prize, so the
element of consideration must be eliminated to avoid violating” gambling or
lottery prohibitions.10  Ascertaining what is consideration can prove, however,
to be difficult.
This Article addresses how the element of consideration is analyzed in the
context of whether a particular activity is illegal gambling or a legal sweep-
the hope of obtaining a larger value, or to part with his money at all; and the spirit of
gambling is in no way cultivated or stimulated, which is the essential evil of lotteries, and
which our statute is enacted to prevent.”).
2 See Anthony N. Cabot & Louis V. Csoka, The Games People Play:  Is It Time For A New
Legal Approach To Prize Games?, 4 NEV. L.J. 197, 204 (2003-2004).
3 See id. at 199.
4 Id.
5 Morrow v. State, 511 P.2d 127, 128 (Alaska 1973) (“Where the term ‘lottery’ is not
defined by statute, courts generally adopt a definition including three essential elements:
consideration, chance, and prize”).
6 See, e.g., City of Wink v. Griffith Amusement Co., 100 S.W.2d 695, 701 (Tex. 1936).
7 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-10-102(2) (2009) (defining gambling as “risking any
money, credit, deposit, or other thing of value for gain contingent in whole or in part upon
lot, chance, the operation of a gambling device, or the happening or outcome of an event,
including a sporting event, over which the person taking a risk has no control, but does not
include . . . bona fide contests of skill . . . in which awards are made only to entrants or the
owners of entries . . . .”) (emphasis added).
8 See Anthony N. Cabot, Glenn J. Light & Karl F. Rutledge, Alex Rodriguez, A Monkey, and
the Game of Scrabble:  The Hazard of Using Illogic to Define the Legality of Games of
Mixed Skill and Chance, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 383, 390-94 (2008).
9 See generally ANTHONY N. CABOT, INTERNET GAMBLNG REPORT IV: AN EVOLVING CON-
FLICT BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY, POLICY & LAW 15–16 (Trace Publications 2001); see also
Chuck Humphrey, State Gambling Law Summary (2007), http://www.gambling-law-us.com/
State-Law-Summary (setting forth and describing in depth the various tests utilized in differ-
ent jurisdictions) (last visited Feb. 3, 2009).
10 Anthony N. Cabot & Jennifer Van Kirk, Internet Sweepstakes, Contests and Games,
BLOOMBERG L.R. INTELL. PROP., July 23, 2007, at 1, 1-2.
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stakes.  For example, the ABA survey activity certainly has both prizes and a
chance drawing that determines winners, but does the requirement that you
must complete a survey for entry constitute consideration?  What about the
retail promotions through which you receive a game piece for buying products?
What about an unlicensed slot machine that you can play by either inserting a
coin or sending a self-addressed, stamped envelope to receive a code that per-
mits you to play one game for free?  These and other scenarios are addressed in
this Article.
II. PUBLIC POLICY AND POLICY GOALS RELATED TO GAMBLING
Legal gambling has always been a controversial topic.11  Most states con-
sider gambling to be an activity that should generally be prohibited unless it is
heavily regulated, operated by the government, or conducted for educational or
philanthropic purposes.12  This was not always the case.  Historically, “lotteries
were used to . . . finance county and municipal buildings, repair streets, ensure
the water supplies of cities, and build roads, canals and bridges.”13  Some of
the nation’s earliest and most prestigious universities—including Harvard,
Yale, Columbia, Dartmouth, Princeton, and William and Mary—were built
from lottery proceeds.14  In response to a rise in fraud and loss of public sup-
port, states began to abolish lotteries and prohibit private parties from selling
tickets.15  Although there had always been “a group opposing gambling on
moral grounds . . . [t]he flames of opposition were fanned . . . by the prevalence
of scandals and the belief that the poor were being targeted, especially by
lotteries.”16
Therefore, a starting point to an understanding of consideration in gam-
bling is to examine the policy reasons behind state gambling prohibitions.
Arguments against legalized gambling fall into two major camps: either deon-
tological religious/moral or teleological/pragmatic amoral pluralist grounds.17
“Deontology refers to a theory of moral obligation . . . [t]hat is universal and
absolute.”18  Similar to malum in se, wrong is always wrong, under all circum-
11 See, e.g., Stevens v. Cincinnati Times-Star Co., 73 N.E. 1058, 1062 (Ohio 1905) (“All
highly civilized peoples recognize the evils to society arising from the encouragement of the
gambling spirit, and it is for the purpose of discouraging this vice and preventing the spread
of it that laws are passed in other states like the Ohio statutes to punish and prohibit.  Such
laws are and should be interpreted and enforced by our courts in a way calculated to secure
the object sought.”).
12 See ANTHONY N. CABOT, CASINO GAMING:  POLICY, ECONOMICS AND REGULATION 5
(Trace Publications 1996).
13 REUVEN BRENNER WITH GABRIELLE A. BRENNER, GAMBLING AND SPECULATION:  A THE-
ORY, A HISTORY, AND A FUTURE OF SOME HUMAN DECISIONS  14 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1990).
14 ROGER DUNSTAN, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH BUREAU, GAMBLING IN CALIFORNIA II-2
(1997), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/97/03/Chapt2.html.
15 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. THOMPSON, LEGALIZED GAMBLING 6 (ABC-CLIO, 1994).
16 Id. at II-4.
17 CABOT, supra note 12, at 20.
18 Id.
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stances, by all people, despite the results.19  “Teleological doctrine is ‘ends’
oriented.  It explains phenomena ‘by final causes’” and offers a “worldly”
approach to problems.20  Pragmatic amoral pluralists also will focus on the
quantifiable impact of gambling, particularly the economic consequences to
players.21
A further explanation of these positions is helpful.  The deontological
religious/moral view is that gambling is a sin and inconsistent with a moral
society.22  The harm is not limited to the impact on the individual but extends
to any activity that even promotes harmful instincts inconsistent with a moral or
religious society.23  For example, some religions view biblical teachings as
commanding Christians to use their talents and direct their efforts to productive
vocations.24  Those religions view gambling as the antithesis of the work ethic;
gamblers seek gain for no effort or productive service.25  Likewise, Christians’
devotion should be with God, not money.26  Greed, or devotion to money, is
considered contrary to the devotion to God.27  Teleological arguments include
that gambling vitiates love for God by exalting the worship of money and sub-
mits outcome to chance, therefore, subverting a trust in God’s dependable pro-
visions for human needs.28
Moralists also see a broader purpose in some lottery statutes, noting that
“the statutes are designed to prevent other evils incident to the operation of
19 See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 501, 1045 (9th ed. 2009) (defining malum in se
and providing historical background on the distinction between malum in se and malum
prohibitum).
20 CABOT, supra note 12, at 20.
21 Social and economic externalities proffered for a ban on gambling include dysfunctional
gambling, crime, adverse economic consequences, corruption, and environmental impact.
Many moralists adopt a pluralist position because it may assist in reaching a broader audi-
ence.  In these cases, the moralist’s argument often contains untrue or inaccurate statements
on the dangers or evils of the activity in an effort to instill fear or unfairly taint the activity.
A good discussion of this, as it relates to “victimless” crimes, is found in PETER MCWIL-
LIAMS, AIN’T NOBODY’S BUSINESS IF YOU DO:  THE ABSURIDITY OF CONSENSUAL CRIMES IN
A FREE SOCIETY 41-49 (Jean Sedillos ed., Prelude Press 1993).
22 See, e.g., Watchtower 588 (Oct. 1, 1974).  The official journal of the Jehovah’s Witnesses
regularly reports on gambling, calling it an activity of “greed” and “covetness” stimulating
“selfishness and lack of concern for others.”
23 See, e.g., THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, THE BOOK OF DISCIPLINE:  SOCIAL PRINCI-
PLES  6-1 (1984) (“Gambling is a menace to society, deadly to the best interests of morals,
social, economic, and spiritual life, and destructive of good government.”).
24 J. Terry Price, What Does the Bible Say about Gambling?, http://www.crosswalk.com /
1201620 (citing J. Kerby Anderson, Gambling, http://www.probe.org/site/c.fdKEIMNsEoG/
b.4217809/k.C93D/Gambling.html)  (“The Bible emphasizes the sovereignty of God (Matt.
10:29-30), while gambling is based upon chance. The Bible admonishes us to work cre-
atively and for the benefit of others (Eph. 4:28), while gambling fosters a ‘something for
nothing’ attitude. The Bible condemns materialism (Matt. 6:24-25), while gambling pro-
motes it.”) (last visited Aug. 20, 2009).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., The Salvation Army, What is the big deal about gambling?, http://
www.salvationarmy.org/alove/engage_culture_gambling.shtml (citing Matt 6:24 “No one
can serve two masters. . . . You cannot serve both God and money.”) (last visited Aug. 20,
2009).
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schemes of chance, such as the general excitement of the gambling instinct, and
the purchase of luxuries that might not otherwise be bought.”29
This deontological religious/moral view was evident in the debate over
federal laws prohibiting the mailing of lottery material in 1893, when Senator
George Frisbie Hoar from Massachusetts noted:
I know Harvard College in my own state had repeated lotteries, as had hospitals and
humane enterprises also.  But our people have determined substantially in all the
States in the Union that that ought not to be done, that it fosters a spirit of gambling,
the idea of getting something that you do not pay for or do not work for, which is the
bane of all human society wherever it prevails. . . .30
The concept of “lottery consideration” is broader than mere passage of
money from participants to operator.31  Moralists look to extend the laws
beyond the act of gambling to prohibit activities that arouse the “gambling
spirit” in the community and, in turn, raise the level of “gambling fever.”32
In contrast, pluralist opposition derives from the view that gambling is
undesirable as a matter of social or economic policy.33  Here, the focus is on
the harm created by losing one’s money or other property.34  As one commen-
tator noted, “[t]he essential purpose of the anti-gambling act is to prevent peo-
ple from squandering their money against odds which are not fully appreciated;
and it follows that unless something of value is surrendered by lottery partici-
pants, no harm is done.”35  The concerns of pluralist gaming opponents can
extend to further societal problems caused by such dysfunctional gamblers who
can be devastated by incurring enormous debt and engaging in criminal activity
to support the gambling.36  Some religions also adopt a results-oriented
approach.37  For example, according to a Catholic encyclopedia:
[a] person is entitled to dispose of his own property as he wills . . . so long as in
doing so he does not render himself incapable of fulfilling duties incumbent upon
him by reason of justice or charity.  Gambling, therefore, though a luxury, is not
considered sinful except when the indulgence in it is inconsistent with duty.38
29 Note, Bank Night and Similar Devices as Illegal Lotteries, 50 YALE L.J. 941, 946 (1940-
1941).
30 26 Cong. Rec. 4314 (1894) (statement of Sen. Hoar).
31 See, e.g., Bank Night, supra note 29, at 946.
32 See, e.g., Baedaro v. Caldwell, 56 N.W.2d 706, 710 (1953) (“Anything affording neces-
sary lure to indulge the gambling instinct and appeal to the gambling propensities of man is a
gambling device.”); People v. Cerniglia, 11 N.Y.S.2d 5, 7 (City Magis. Ct. 1939) (free
replays are “an incentive that fosters the gambling spirit”).
33 CABOT, supra note 12, at 36.
34 Id.
35 Ian D. Volner, The Games Consumers Play:  “Giveaway” and The Law - A Conflict of
Policies, 25 FED. COMM. B.J. 121, 129 (1972-1973).
36 See generally Robert Ladouceur, et al., Social Costs of Pathological Gambling, 10 J.
GAMBLING STUDIES 399 (Winter 1994).
37 See generally CABOT, supra note 12, at 20-21.
38 WILLIAM N. THOMPSON, GAMBLING IN AMERICA:  AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY,
ISSUES, AND SOCIETY 322-23 (ABC-CLIO, Inc. 2001) (quoting THE NEW CATHOLIC ENCY-
CLOPEDIA 1967, 276).
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III. MAJOR THEORIES OF GAMBLING CONSIDERATION
These conflicting views of the policies against gambling represented by
the deontological religious/moral and the teleological/pragmatic amoral plural-
ist views have influenced the legal concept of consideration in the context of
gambling prohibitions.  Over the years, the American courts have developed
three major theories of consideration in addressing gambling cases.
A. Simple Contract Consideration
Consideration is a well-known concept in contract law.  For the early part
of this country’s existence, the Simple Contract Consideration Test served as
the definition of consideration for gambling.39  As the name suggests, under the
Simple Contract Consideration Test, courts find gambling consideration if the
consideration could support a simple contract.40  According to Professor Mel-
vin Eisenberg, a game forms a structural agreement in which there are mutual
bargains for a chance: “[t]he contestant enters the contest for the chance of
winning, while the promoter stages the game to increase the probability of
transacting.”41  Under the Simple Contract Consideration Test, either a detri-
ment to the patron or a benefit to the promoter suffices to constitute considera-
tion.  Thus, even a heavily lopsided exchange can constitute sufficient
consideration,42 such as a game in which participants neither pay nor perform
any task other than entering the contest.43  Under the Simple Contract Consid-
eration Test, consideration “need not consist of money or something of actual
pecuniary value, but could consist of an act done at the request of the holder of
the lottery if that act is one bargained for by the holder of the lottery.”44
An example of a benefit constituting consideration can be found in Beck v.
Fox Kansas Theater, which involved a promotion where a theater gave raffle
tickets to both paying customers and anyone else who asked.45  The court held
that even though free raffle tickets were provided to anyone who asked, the
mere design of the promotion to stimulate demand for a product was sufficient
to be consideration.46  Consequently, the court determined the promotion con-
stituted an illegal lottery.47
39 State v. Eckerd’s Suburban, Inc., 164 A.2d 873, 875 (Del. 1960); State ex rel. Beck v.
Fox Kansas Theatre Co., 62 P.2d 929, 934 (Kan. 1936); Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 117
A.2d 487, 495 (N.J. 1955) (citing Maine v. Bussiere, 154 A.2d 702, 705 (Me. 1959) and
Dorman v. Publix-Saenger-Sparks Theatres, 184 So. 886 (Fla. 1938)).
40 Mark B. Wessman, Is “Contract” The Name of the Game? Promotional Games as Test
Cases For Contract Theory, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 635, 652 (1992); see also, e.g., Blackburn v.
Ippolito, 156 So. 2d 550, 552-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
41 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Probability and Chance in Contract Law, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1005, 1044 (1998).
42 Wessman, supra note 40, at 653 (“Lop-sided exchanges count as instances of ‘considera-
tion,’ and some cases involving promotional games contain language suggestive of the ‘pep-
percorn’ theory of consideration.”).
43 Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1043.
44 Eckerd’s, 164 A.2d at 875.
45 State ex rel. Beck v. Fox Kansas Theatre Co., 62 P.2d 929, 932 (Kan. 1936).
46 Id. at 937.
47 Id.
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Therefore, courts following the Simple Contract Consideration Test con-
sider virtually any inconvenience to the patron to enter a promotion sufficient
to constitute a recognized detriment.48  This could include having to be present
to win or merely complying with any of the rules for participation.49  In some
instances, courts had devised almost a per se illegality test, where even having
to register was a sufficient detriment.  One extreme example involved a grocery
store marketing scheme in New Jersey.50  Participants could fill out a free entry
form and return it to the nearest grocery store to enter a monthly drawing for
various home appliances.51  In an action for declaratory judgment that the
scheme was not an illegal lottery, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found a
“clear legislative intent against lotteries”52 and actually held that “consideration
is not a necessary element of a lottery.”53  Even so, the court went on to apply
the Simple Contract Consideration Test and found that consideration existed
because the scheme inconvenienced the participant by requiring her to com-
plete and drop off the entry form, and the scheme benefitted the grocery store
and its advertising company by increasing business volume at the stores.54
The Simple Contract Consideration Test, when applied to criminal gam-
bling statutes, often is consistent with deontological, moral, or religious objec-
tions to gambling.55  Anti-gambling laws in jurisdictions using the test often
“are designed to prevent other evils incident to the operation of schemes of
chance, such as the general excitement of the gambling instinct and the
purchase of luxuries that might not otherwise be bought.”56
48 See, e.g., id. at 935 (citing Maughs v. Porter, 161 S.E. 242 (Va. 1931)); State ex rel.
Hunter v. Fox Beatrice Theatres Corp., 275 N.W. 605, 606 (Neb. 1937); cf. Knox Indus.
Corp. v. State ex rel. Scanland, 258 P.2d 910, 914 (Okla. 1953) (“[T]he rules do require any
prospective participant to go to some Knox Service Station, or Store, and ask for a ticket.
That this requires expenditure of time and inconvenience cannot be denied.”).
49 See, e.g., Beck, 62 P.2d at 935; Hunter, 275 N.W. at 606; cf. Knox, 258 P.2d at 914
(“[T]he rules do require any prospective participant to go to some Knox Service Station, or
Store, and ask for a ticket.  That this requires expenditure of time and inconvenience cannot
be denied.”).
50 Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 117 A.2d 487, 489-90 (N.J. 1955).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 497.
53 Id. at 494.
54 Id. at 495 (“But we do not have to rest our decision on this construction of our statute
alone as negativing the need for consideration to find a lottery, for the consideration is in fact
clearly present here, both in the form of detriment or inconvenience to the promisee at the
request of the promisor and of a benefit to the promisor.”).
55 See, e.g., State ex rel. Beck v. Fox Kansas Theatre Co., 62 P.2d 929, 939 (Kan. 1936)
(citing Cross et al. v. People, 32 P. 821, 822 (Colo. 1893)).
56 Bank Night, supra note 29, at 946; see also State ex Inf. McKittrick v. Globe-Democrat
Pub. Co., 110 S.W.2d 705, 713 (Mo. 1937); State ex rel. Home Planners Depository v.
Hughes, 253 S.W. 229, 231 (Mo. 1923); State v. Becker et al., 154 S.W. 769, 771 (Mo.
1913); State ex rel. Hunter v. Fox Beatrice Theatre Corp. et al., 275 N.W. 605, 606 (Neb.
1937); State v. Schwemler, 60 P.2d 938, 939 (Or. 1936); Charles Pickett, Contests and the
Lottery Laws, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1196, 1205 (1932) (“The theory behind lottery laws is that
people should be protected from dissipating their money by gambling against odds which
usually are not fully appreciated.”).
\\server05\productn\N\nvg\1-1\NVG101.txt unknown Seq: 8 20-JUL-10 15:18
8 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:1
B. Promoter Benefit Test
Another test with questionable continued viability is the Promoter Benefit
Test, which had found some favor in the 1960s and early 1970s.57  This test
focuses solely on the economic benefit received by the promoter.58  Considera-
tion exists where there is “a class of persons who, in addition to receiving or
being entitled to chances on prizes, supply consideration for all the chances in
bulk by purchasing whatever the promoter is selling, whether the purchasers
were required to do so or not under the wording of the promoter’s rules.”59
Because the focal point is on the benefit received by the promoter, whether the
valuable consideration comes from one or all participants is irrelevant.60
Accordingly, courts that apply this test look to see if the promoter has derived a
direct economic benefit from any of the participants.61
This test looks only to whether the promoter has received tangible eco-
nomic benefits because participants have paid for entry into the promotion or
have paid for some product or service that also gave entry into the promotion.62
In State v. Bader, an owner of a cafeteria had given away a new automobile to
the holder of a lucky ticket.63  Tickets were distributed free of charge to both
customers and non-customers.64  All tickets, however, had to be returned to a
barrel located inside the cafeteria.65  The Municipal Court of Cincinnati held
that the distribution of the vast majority of tickets upon payment for meals and
the increased patronage received from the operation of the game sufficiently
fulfilled the consideration requirement.66  The fact that an insubstantial number
of tickets had been distributed to noncustomers was deemed irrelevant and
57 See, e.g., Boyd v. Piggly Wiggly S., Inc., 155 S.E.2d 630, 637 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967)
(quoting Whitley v. McConnell, 66 S.E. 933 (Ga. 1910);  Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Boat-
right, 155 S.E.2d 642 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); Idea Research & Dev. Corp. v. Hultman & Cent.
Broad. Co., 131 N.W.2d 496, 510 (Iowa 1964); Smith v. State, 127 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1939); Featherstone v. Indep. Serv. Station Ass’n of Texas et al., 10 S.W.2d 124,
127 (Tex. App. 1928); State ex rel. Schillberg v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 450 P.2d 949, 955-56
(Wash. 1969); 61 Wis. Op. Att’y Gen. 405 (1972).
58 See, e.g., Boyd, 155 S.E.2d at 637 (quoting Whitley v. McConnell, 66 S.E. 933 (Ga.
1910); Winn-Dixie, 155 S.E.2d at 642; Idea, 131 N.W.2d at 501; Smith, 127 S.W.2d at 299;
Featherstone, 10 S.W.2d at 127; Schillberg, 450 P.2d at 955-56; 61 Wis. Op. Att’y Gen. 405
(1972).
59 Boyd, 155 S.E.2d at 632.
60 Id. at 639 (“‘[A]ll chances are paid for in mass by the general body of purchasers of
tickets, although an individual registrant may not pay for his chance. Therefore, the theater
which distributes the chances is paid if the sale of some tickets be looked at as a whole,
although some chances are given away.’” (quoting Barker v. State, 193 S.E. 605, 609 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1937)).
61 See generally Boyd, 155 S.E.2d at 639; Winn-Dixie, 155 S.E.2d 642; Idea, 131 N.W.2d at
499; Smith, 127 S.W.2d at 298; Featherstone, 10 S.W.2d at 127; Schillberg, 450 P.2d at
956; 61 Wis. Op. Att’y Gen. 405 (1972).
62 See generally Boyd, 155 S.E.2d at 639; Winn-Dixie, 155 S.E.2d 642; Idea, 131 N.W.2d at
501; Smith, 127 S.W.2d at 299; Featherstone, 10 S.W.2d at 127; Schillberg, 450 P.2d at
956; 61 Op. Att’y Gen. Wis. 405 (1972).
63 State v. Bader, 24 Ohio N.P.(n.s.) 186, 192 (1922).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
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merely designed to evade the lottery laws.67  The court instead focused its
attention on whether any benefit had flowed to the proprietor through the oper-
ation of the promotional game and, consequently, in doing so, the court recog-
nized that because the proprietor was a sound businessman, he would not have
given away a $1,300 car without the expectation of a return.68
Unlike the Bader court, however, not all courts required a vast majority of
participants to actually purchase admission tickets to find consideration.  In
State v. Schubert Theatre Players Co., the court held that a “free” ticket to a
chance at a prize given with the purchase of each theater show ticket was not in
fact “free” because the purchase price was for both the admission and the
chance.69  While the court noted “a person may distribute or give away his
property or money by lot or chance provided he does so without a considera-
tion,” it concluded that evidence that anyone could get the tickets for free was
immaterial because “the moment some pay for the chance of participating in
the drawing of the prize it is a lottery under the law, no matter how many
receive a chance to also participate free and without any consideration.”70  The
court focused on whether any economic benefit had flowed to the promoter
through the operation of the drawing to determine if the promotion was a lot-
tery.71  In this respect, Schubert Theatre further lessens the consideration
requirement as the court found that the operation of a promotion game may
cause an increase in the patronage of a business even though a vast majority of
the participants in the game did not make purchases.
Some vestige of this rule still applies.  In the unpublished 1992 opinion
State v. Razorback Room, Inc.,72 an Arkansas appellate court held that volun-
tary “donation”-based bingo was an illegal lottery.  The court explained that
even though free play was allowed:
All three elements of a lottery are present.  The elements of prize and chance are not
disputed.  While the issue of consideration was disputed at trial, the evidence shows
that the vast majority of bingo patrons in fact pay money to participate in the various
games.  The fact that these payments may be called donations is not, on this issue,
significant.  The defendants admit that if a significant portion of the bingo patrons
chose to play for free, the bingo game would collapse.  The game did not cease to be
a lottery because some of the players were admitted to play for free, so long as others
continued to pay for their chances.  The presence of non-paying participants did not
change the status of those who paid.  If it is a lottery as to those who pay, it is
necessarily a lottery as to those who do not pay for their chances.73
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 State v. Schubert Theatre Players Co., 281 N.W. 369, 370-71 (Minn. 1938).
70 Id. at 370.
71 Id.
72 State v. Razorback Room, Inc., No. 91-7596 (Pulaski Co. Ch., 6th Div., Sept. 29, 1992).
73 Id.(internal citations omitted); see also F.A.C.E. Trading, Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer &
Indus. Svcs, 717 N.W.2d 377, 386 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006).
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C. Economic Value Test
The past eighty years have seen an abandonment of the Simple Contract
Consideration Test and the Promoter Benefit Test.74  As a result, consideration
to support a legal contract is no longer the same as consideration necessary to
support an illegal gambling transaction.75  Perhaps the first case to create this
distinction was Yellow-Stone Kit v. State.76  This action centered on lotteries,
which during the late 1800s, were the most widely available form of gambling
in the United States and most closely identified in the public mind with the
evils of gambling.77  In that case, the Alabama Supreme Court held that a retail
promoter did not conduct an illegal lottery because the promoter did not
demand that participants in the drawing purchase tickets.78  Because the pay-
ment of money was not required to obtain a chance to win, the court held that
there was no consideration.79
While the Yellow-Stone Kit case marked the creation of a new promotional
marketing industry, the idea of any form of legal prize gaming based on chance
remained controversial.  Conservative legal commentators such as Francis Wil-
liams hailed any decision rejecting Yellow-Stone Kit.80  In Grimes v. State, the
Alabama Supreme Court analyzed a movie theater’s “bank night” promotion in
which everyone, both movie theater patrons and non-paying members of the
public, was given the opportunity to sign a card for the chance of getting his or
her name drawn from a “hopper,” at which point the lucky winner would be
74 See, e.g., Cal. Gasoline Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp. of Fresno, Inc., 330 P.2d 778,
788-89 (Cal. 1958); People v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 202 N.E.2d 473, 475 (Ill. 1964); State
v. Bussiere, 154 A.2d 702, 706 (Me. 1959); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Att’y Gen., 280 N.E.2d 406,
412 (Mass. 1972); State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre Corp., 132 P.2d 689, 696
(Mont. 1942); People v. Mail & Express Co., 179 N.Y.S. 640, 644-45 (N.Y. Sp. Sess. 1921);
Cudd v. Aschenbrenner, 377 P.2d 150, 155 (Or. 1962); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Hansen, 600 P.2d
982, 985 (Utah 1979).
75 See, e.g., Cal. Gasoline, 330 P.2d at 788-89; Eagle, 202 N.E.2d at 475; Bussiere, 154
A.2d at 706; Mobil, 280 N.E.2d at 412; Stafford, 132 P.2d at 696; Mail, 179 N.Y.S. at 644-
45; Cudd, 377 P.2d at 155; Albertson’s, 600 P.2d at 985.
76 Yellow-Stone Kit v. State, 7 So. 338 (Ala.1890).
77 Id. at 339.  (“The history of lotteries for the past three centuries in England, and for
nearly a hundred years in America, shows that they have been schemes for the distribution of
money or property by lot in which chances were sold for money, either directly, or through
some cunning device.  The evil flowing from them has been the cultivation of the gambling
spirit,—the hazarding of money with the hope by chance of obtaining a larger sum,—often
stimulating an inordinate love of gain, arousing the most violent passions of one’s baser
nature, sometimes tempting the gambler to risk all he possesses on the turn of a single card
or cast of a single die, and ‘tending, as centuries of human experience now fully attest, to
mendicancy and idleness on the one hand, and moral profligacy and debauchery on the
other.’ Johnson v. State, 83 Ala. 65, 3 South. Rep. 790.  It is in the light of these facts, and
the mischief thus intended to be remedied, that we must construe our statutory and constitu-
tional prohibitions against lotteries and devices in the nature of lotteries. Ehrgott v. Mayor,
48 Am. Rep. 622.”).
78 Yellow-Stone Kit, 7 So. at 339.
79 Id. (“[W]e can see nothing in the evidence from which it can be inferred that any one,
present or absent, paid any valuable consideration, directly or indirectly, for these tickets, or
for the chance of getting a prize.”).
80 FRANCIS EMMETT WILLIAMS, FLEXIBLE-PARTICIPATION LOTTERIES 192-95 (Thomas L.
Book Co. 1938).
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entitled to a prize if he could claim it within two minutes.81  The court con-
cluded: “[b]ecause some have not been drawn into the gambling phase does not
render it any the less a lottery, with whatever of evil it engenders, as to the
large public who have paid.”82  Williams noted this case was “of inestimable
value to the citizens of the great state of Alabama” because it swept “away the
last vestige of support that the promoters of such lotteries have found in Yel-
low-Stone Kit v. State.”83  He was wrong.
A major turning point in the debate occurred in 1954 when the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized the difference between consideration for contract
and gambling purposes. FCC v. American Broadcasting Co. (hereinafter
“ABC”) considered whether a promotional activity requiring only that listeners
accept a phone call from the radio station had sufficient consideration to be an
illegal lottery.84  While merely having to listen to the radio would have been
sufficient consideration to support a contract, Chief Justice Earl Warren
inferred that as a criminal prohibition, the consideration element of lottery laws
should be more rigorously interpreted in the defendant’s favor.85  Warren rec-
ognized “that it would be stretching the statute to the breaking point to give it
an interpretation that would make such programs a crime.”86  This was the
basis for a departure in definition of consideration for contract law and gaming
law purposes.
The influence of the ABC case predicated considerable change at the state
court level.  In a piece on consideration written in 1972, Ian Volner discussed
the relaxing of the lottery laws as they applied to promotional activities.87  In
discussing the attempts of state legislatures to redefine the element of consider-
ation to permit the operation of good lotteries while continuing the ban on the
bad, Volner detailed several states, including Oklahoma and Illinois, which
changed their statutory and judicial views to make clear that the consideration
required for an illegal lottery was a pecuniary detriment to the patron.88  Volner
appreciated “that unless something of value is surrendered by lottery partici-
pants, no harm is done.”89
Both the Yellow-Stone Kit and the ABC cases adopted an economic value
theory of consideration that focuses on what the participant must give up to be
eligible to win a prize.90  Under the test, referred to in this article as the Eco-
nomic Value Test, consideration “means ‘something of value and not merely
the formal or technical consideration, such as registering one’s name or attend-
ing a certain place, which might be sufficient consideration to support a con-
81 Grimes v. State, 178 So. 73, 73-74 (Ala. 1937).
82 Id. at 74.
83 WILLIAMS, supra note 80, at 194-95.
84 FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.S. 284, 286 n.2, 290-91 (1954).
85 Id. at 296.
86 Id. at 294.
87 Volner, supra note 35, at 123.
88 Id. at 134-36.
89 Id. at 129.
90 See Yellow-Stone Kit v. State, 7 So. 338 (Ala. 1890); FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.S.
284 (1954).
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tract.’”91  Similarly, that an operator simply may benefit from a promotional
scheme fails to satisfy the consideration requirement.92  In sum, consideration
is met only when the participant must pay something of economic value either
through the purchase of a chance to win or indirectly through the purchase of a
product or service.93
Unlike the Simple Contract Consideration Test, which focuses on mutual
bargains for chance, the Economic Value Test focuses on what a participant
gives up in exchange for a chance to win a prize.94  For example, in Cudd v.
Aschenbrenner, the plaintiffs appealed a declaratory judgment that held their
promotion scheme was an illegal lottery.95  The scheme, which intended to
attract customers to grocery stores, involved a weekly drawing.96  To register
for the drawing, participants must have submitted personal information on a
registration card and have validated a coupon at the grocery store each week
before the drawing.97  At the time of the drawing, the participant was required
to be present in the grocery store parking lot to claim the prize.98
The Court found that the plaintiffs’ promotional program did not require
consideration from participants in that there was no obligation for a participant
to make a purchase in order to participate.99  In reaching this decision, the court
rejected the argument that “consideration paid by one person taints the whole
scheme.”100  The court ascertained that the legislature intended the anti-lottery
statutes to prohibit schemes that required participants to provide something of
economic value to participate.101  The court explained that this view did not
undermine generally accepted principles of contractual consideration but
merely recognized “that a lottery is a special kind of contract which requires a
91 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Att’y Gen., 280 N.E.2d 406, 411 (Mass. 1972) (quoting Common-
wealth v. Heffner, 24 N.E.2d 508, 508-09 (Mass. 1939)).
92 Mobil, 280 N.E.2d at 412.  (“[T]he incidental increase in business attendant upon the use
of promotional games like those involved in the present case is not the type of consideration
necessary to make these games lotteries.”).
93 See, State v. Cox, 349 P.2d 104, 106 (Mont. 1960).  (The court held the scheme unlawful
on the ground that participants necessarily suffered a pecuniary detriment—the purchase of
goods—as a precondition of eligibility.).
94 See People v. Eagle Food Ctrs., 202 N.E.2d 473, 475 (Ill. 1974) (“Our statutory definition
of a lottery, in clear and unambiguous terms, refers to persons who ‘have paid or promised
consideration’ for a chance to win a prize.  Given their plain and accepted meanings, these
words do not admit to a construction or comprehension that the necessary consideration may
be found in benefits flowing to the promisor.  Their natural purport is, rather, that the consid-
eration must flow from the one who is given the opportunity to win a prize by chance.”).
95 Cudd v. Aschenbrenner, 377 P.2d 150, 151-52 (Or. 1962).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 152.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 156-57.
100 Id.  (The court also reasoned that this argument failed to consider that neither the gro-
cery store nor the participants believed purchasing an item at the store was a requirement to
participate in the weekly drawing, and parties must intend for their actions to constitute such
consideration.).
101 Id. at 155.
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special kind of consideration—consideration which can impoverish the individ-
ual who parts with it.”102
Cudd reflects the distinction between the deontological religious/moral
view of gambling and the teleological/pragmatic amoral pluralist view.  Unlike
other cases that focused on “other evils incident to the operation of schemes of
chance,”103 the Cudd court focused on “the impoverishment of the individual
and its attendant evils.”104  Accordingly, because this policy concentrates on
harm to the participants, benefits to the promoter are irrelevant in Economic
Value Test jurisdictions.  Simply, without having to pay to enter, no economic
harm can come to the participant and, therefore, no consideration is
recognized.105
Under the Economic Value Test, the passing of the consideration does not,
however, have to be a direct payment for entry into the sweepstakes.106  For
example, a requirement to buy a good or service as a condition to entry in a
sweepstakes is a form of combined cash consideration because the only way to
enter the promotion is to buy a product or service. State v. Cox is an example
of such promotion in which the court held that the requirement to purchase an
item to gain entry into the contest resulted in the patron necessarily suffering a
pecuniary loss.107 Cox involved a “Chinese Lottery,” in which persons making
purchases at a grocery store were given numbered cards that served as the basis
for the drawing.108  The Montana Supreme Court held the scheme unlawful on
the ground that participants necessarily suffered a pecuniary detriment—the
purchase of the goods—as a pre-condition to being eligible for the drawing.109
In reaching this conclusion, the court disregarded the fact that participants
received value for the payment—the groceries purchased—and that there was
no additional charge for the right to participate.110  While a few states have
adopted an “equivalent value” exemption—i.e., if the person receives “fair
value” for a purchase, with which they also receive entry into a sweepstakes, it
is not unlawful111—virtually all cases in which promotional sweepstakes
entries require purchase of a good or service have been found to be unlawful
102 Id. (emphasis added) (“We do no violence to the law of contracts when we hold that a
lottery contemplates a greater consideration than is generally required to support a
contract.”).
103 Bank Night, supra note 29, at 946.
104 Cudd, 377 P.2d at 155.
105 Volner, supra note 35, at 129.
106 See, e.g., State v. Cox, 349 P.2d 104, 106 (Mont. 1960).
107 Id. at 106-07.
108 Id. at 105.
109 Id. at 106.  (“[W]here one is required to make an outlay of money in order to participate
in a scheme whereby an award is made by chance, the participant pays valuable considera-
tion for the chance to participate, notwithstanding the fact he may also receive merchandise
at the same time in return.”).
110 Id.
111 See, e.g,, Treasured Arts, Inc. v. Ark. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., No. CV 97-716,
(1997 Pulaski Co., Ch., 6th Div. 1997); Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2006-052 (June 28, 2006)
available at 2006 WL 1794426, at *3 (Ark. A.G. June 28, 2006).  (“One Pulaski County
Circuit Court has found that phone cards with game pieces attached, but not dispensed by
machines, were ‘legitimate commercial products’ and that consideration was paid for those
products so that the products and game pieces were neither gambling nor a lottery.”).
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even where the purchaser has received equivalent value for the product
received.112
The Economic Value Test has a second consideration.  The economic
value given by the participant must be more than an incidental amount paid to a
third party to facilitate the entry into the promotion.  The participant parting
with something of economic value is not enough.  For example, incidental sums
paid to third parties such as postage stamps do not constitute consideration.113
Likewise, payments to providers of internet services are unlikely to invalidate a
sweepstakes by an unrelated promoter where entry is available only online.
Potential issues, however, face those who use text messages as a method of
entry.114  Two types of text messaging rates might apply to a sweepstakes
entry.  The first is a standard rate that the participant pays to the telephone
carrier for text messaging.  This is typically significantly less than the cost of a
postage stamp and is retained by the carrier alone.  The second is a premium or
special rate arrangement in which the carrier shares the fees received from the
customer with the sweepstakes promoter.  Regardless of whether the actual fee
charged to the customer is less than the cost of postage, this arrangement cre-
ates potential legal risk because both aspects of the Economic Value Test are
met: the customer is paying something of value, money that, in turn, is partially
accruing to the benefit of the promoter.115
While some of the migration to the Economic Value Test resulted from
court decisions, many states altered their public policy by statutory abrogation
of the older tests.116  For example, Utah, a state with a strong anti-gambling
public policy that prohibits any form of gambling and has not historically relied
on the Simple Contract Consideration test, statutorily adopted the more lenient
Economic Value Test. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Hansen involved a Utah statute that
defined “lottery” as “any scheme for the disposal or distribution of property by
chance among any persons who have paid or promised to pay any valuable
112 See, e.g., Cox, 349 P.2d at 106.
113 See, e.g., Haskell v. Time, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1392, 1404 (E.D. Cal. 1994).  (“Plaintiff
concedes that no purchase is required to enter defendants’ sweepstakes, but instead asserts
that the payment of twenty-nine cents postage is ‘valuable consideration.’  This assertion is
untenable. The California Supreme Court has held that a requirement that a sweepstakes
entrant deposit the entry form at the sponsor’s place of business is not ‘valuable considera-
tion’ sufficient to state a cause of action under California law. California Gas Retailers v.
Regal Petroleum Corp., 50 Cal.2d 844, 861-62, 330 P.2d 778 (1958).  The time, energy, and
expense required under those rules exceeds the twenty-nine cents required here.  Thus, plain-
tiff’s claim that the sweepstakes themselves amount to illegal lotteries or contests is dis-
missed since the definitions of both “contest” and “lottery” require the payment of
consideration.”).
114 See generally Kan. Op. Att’y Gen., 88-125 (Aug. 31, 1988) (“In addition to being able
to obtain a coupon by purchasing a Lottery ticket, the private business may provide a toll-
free number for persons to call to receive free coupons for similar food items and discounts.
The number must be toll-free so that the people do not have to pay to get a coupon. This is
so because consideration is defined as ‘anything which is a commercial or financial advan-
tage to the promoter or a disadvantage to any participant.’”).
115 Id.
116 See, e.g., People v. Eagle Food Ctrs. Inc., 202 N.E.2d 473, 474-76 (Ill. 1964); State v.
Highwood Service, Inc., 473 P.2d 97 (Kan. 1970); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Hansen, 600 P.2d
982, 984-86 (Utah 1979).
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consideration for the chance of obtaining property.”117  As a result, the court
rejected the contention that the participant’s intangible expenses, such as incon-
venience, effort, and transportation costs, together with the scheme-promoter’s
increased profits and patronage, constituted consideration.118  In construing the
statutory language, the court focused on the participants:  the issue was “not
what the promoter receives but what the player parts with . . . The profits to
Albertson’s are not ‘paid . . . for the chance of obtaining property’ and thus
cannot be part of the ‘valuable consideration’ required by our statute to find a
lottery.”119  Relying on the reasoning set forth in Cudd, the court also refused
to interpret “time, effort, inconvenience, and exercise of choice” as valuable
consideration.120
Several other states have statutory definitions that recognize that the par-
ticipants must pay or risk something tangible.121  North Dakota, for example,
defines “gambling” as “risking any money, credit, deposit, or other thing of
value for gain, contingent, wholly or partially, upon lot, chance, the operation
of gambling apparatus, or the happening or outcome of an event.”122  Minne-
sota defines “bet” as “a bargain whereby the parties mutually agree to a gain or
loss by one to the other of specified money, property or benefit dependent upon
chance although the chance is accompanied by some element of skill.”123
The Federal Government also adopted the Economic Value Test in the
federal Deceptive Mail Prevention and Enforcement Act.124  This is the only
federal law to directly regulate sweepstakes promotions.  In particular, the Act
states that
[E]ntry materials for a sweepstakes or a promotion that purports to be a sweepstakes;
and . . . does not contain a statement that discloses in the mailing, in the rules, and on
the order or entry form, that no purchase is necessary to enter such sweepstakes [“is
nonmailable matter, shall not be carried or delivered by mail, and shall be disposed of
as the Postal Service directs.”]125
IV. FLEXIBLE ENTRY SWEEPSTAKES
While a fundamental condition of a sweepstakes under the Economic
Value Test is that a participant does not have to pay consideration to directly or
indirectly have the chance to win a prize, two possible entrance structures are
common.126  In the first structure, none of the participants pay to enter the
117 Albertson’s, 600 P.2d at 985 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1101(2) (1973))
(emphasis added).
118 Id. at 985-86.
119 Id. at 985 (emphasis added).
120 Id. at 985-86; see also Eagle Food, 202 N.E.2d at 475.
121 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3801 (2009) (“money, credit, deposit or other thing of
value”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 271, §7 (2009) (“property of value”); MISS. CODE ANN. §97-
33-1 (2009) (“valuable thing”); MONT. CODE ANN § 23-5-112 (2007) (“thing of value”).
122 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-28-01 (2008).
123 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.75, subdivision 2, (2009).
124 39 U.S.C. § 3001(k) (2009).
125 39 U.S.C. § 3001(k)(2), (k)(3)(A)(i)-(ii) (2009).
126 See supra notes 74-125 and accompanying text and infra note 132 and accompanying
text.
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sweepstakes.  The promoters have a myriad of reasons to hold such a sweep-
stakes.  In many instances, the promoter hopes that the sweepstakes will assist
in branding itself, creating customer traffic, or bringing revenue from third-
party sponsors or advertisers.  In other circumstances, the promoter may use the
sweepstakes to benefit the branding of third parties and be paid for the effort.
A contemporary example is a permanent sweepstakes internet site where the
prizes for the chance-based games are provided by sponsors whose advertising
is prominently displayed on the site.  These advertiser-supported sweepstakes
do not need to be a traditional raffle or instant-win promotion.  They could
extend to any game of chance including most casino-style games.  Interactive
forms of sweepstakes that integrate advertising into the games are often
referred to as “advergaming.”  Regardless of whether the promoter is using the
sweepstakes for its own products or services or to promote third-party products
or services, in situations where no participants pay to enter, no consideration
exists under the Economic Value Test.
A second model, a revenue model, is referred to as a Flexible Entry
Sweepstakes.  This method involves some participants paying direct or indirect
economic value, but the promoter provides an opportunity for anyone to enter
the sweepstakes for free.  On-product schemes are common and involve promo-
tions in which the entry form is within the packaging or label.127  In more
traditional retail settings, a common example occurs where the purchase of fast
food or beverages comes with the chance to win a prize.128  Persons not want-
ing to buy the food or beverage can request a free game piece at the retail
establishment, through the mail, over the internet, or by calling a toll-free
number.
Flexible methods of entry must be distinguished from closed participation.
As explained by a Kentucky Attorney General opinion discussing a “no
purchase necessary” beverage promotion:
[T]he mere fact that some of the participants in a promotional scheme in fact make
purchases of the sponsor’s products does not, in and of itself, constitute consideration
supporting a lottery, where chances to participate in the scheme are also freely given
away on a reasonably equal basis without respect to the purchase of merchandise.
These schemes, known as “flexible participation” schemes, are not to be confused
with “closed participation” gift enterprise schemes, which are open only to patrons
purchasing goods, services or whatever the promoter is trying to push by the
scheme.129
Thus, in State v. Cox, the Montana Supreme Court found consideration
existed when a scheme required participants to purchase a sponsor’s goods to
receive a “free” entry into a promotional drawing.130  Applying the Economic
Value Test, the court reasoned that the purchase requirement posed the threat of
inducing people “to hazard anything of value to win.”131
Since a participant in a flexible entry sweepstakes does not have to give up
valuable consideration to play, games that offer a free method of entry do not
127 Volner, supra note 35, at 130.
128 Cabot & Csoka, supra note 2, at 204.
129 Ky. Op. Att’y Gen., 81-259, 2-799, 2-801 (1981).
130 State v. Cox, 349 P.2d 104, 106-07 (Mont. 1960).
131 Id.
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implicate the Economic Value Test’s underlying “prevent the impoverishment”
policy rationale.132  Thus, jurisdictions that apply the Economic Value Test
find that a free method of entry negates consideration.  For example, in Califor-
nia Gasoline Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp., the California Supreme Court
held that a promotional scheme lacked consideration because it included a free
method of entry that allowed participants to play without purchasing the spon-
sor’s products.133  The court commented that because anyone could have had
the ability to participate for free, “it would seem that the relative numbers of
tickets distributed with purchases or without purchases should not be determi-
native of the issue involved which is whether the holder, or holders, of the
tickets paid, or promised to pay a valuable consideration for the chance of win-
ning a prize.”134  The court then reasoned that the participants who made a
purchase “‘could not be said to have paid a consideration for the prize tickets
since they could have received them free.’”135
In contrast, jurisdictions that followed the Simple Contract Consideration
Test generally refused to find a lack of consideration because a scheme’s opera-
tor provided a free method of entry.136  Indeed, a court may find consideration
in nearly any act that a participant performs to signify a desire to enter the
contest because the participant is under no legal obligation to perform such an
act.  Under the Promoter Benefit Test, a free method of entry is inherently
irrelevant; a court will find consideration so long as the scheme’s operator ben-
efits from any participant.137
132 See Cudd v. Aschenbrenner, 377 P.2d 150, 155 (Or. 1962).
133 Cal. Gasoline Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp. of Fresno, 330 P.2d 778, 782, 789
(Cal. 1958).
134 Id. at 786.
135 Id. (quoting People v. Carpenter, 297 P.2d 498, 500-01 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956)).
136 In Barber v. Jefferson County Racing Ass’n, Inc., 960 So.2d 599, 611-13 (Ala. 2006),
the Alabama Supreme Court “look[ed] through the form of the operation to its substance”
and decided that consumers were, in fact, paying for their entries even though the entries
were provided for free with purchase of a phone card. Id. at 608, 611.  Even though the
scheme provided free entries that did not require the purchase of a phone card, the court
stated that “the opportunity for free plays does not negate the element of consideration, or
obviate an inquiry into the purpose and effect of the operation as ‘the final proof of . . .
consideration.’” Id. at 613.
137 See Boyd v. Piggly-Wiggly S., Inc., 155 S.E.2d 630 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967).  There, the
plaintiff filed suit to recover a prize she allegedly won through a grocery store giveaway
promotion; the case turned on whether consideration existed. Id. at 632, 635.  Although the
promotion did not require participants to purchase anything to play, participants had to visit
the grocery store to receive a free game piece. Id. at 633.  Interestingly, the plaintiff in the
case knew that she could receive a game piece for free, yet she “had ‘rather purchase some-
thing than go for free’” and would always make a purchase before requesting a game piece.
Id. at 633; see also Grimes v. State, 178 So. 73, 74 (Ala. 1937) (“[T]he sense of good
sportsmanship may exert an influence on the number who put themselves in the position to
draw a prize when they have contributed nothing to the common stake which has brought the
prize into being.”).
The Georgia Appellate Court disdainfully noted the failed attempts of “flexible partici-
pation schemes,” which allow both purchasers and non-purchasers to participate in a spon-
sor’s scheme to circumvent the anti-lottery laws. Boyd, 155 S.E.2d at 638.  The court
discussed prior case law holding flexible participation schemes to be lotteries even though
consideration for the chance to win a prize merged into the purchase price of the sponsor’s
goods. Id. at 640.  It went on to highlight a specific case that “applied this rule without
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V. EQUAL DIGNITY
Occasionally, commentators refer to a concept of equal dignity in sweep-
stakes law.138  In fact, no court has specifically recognized such rule by name,
but instead, through a collection of cases, courts have recognized requirements
of lawful sweepstakes under the Economic Value Test that require equal treat-
ment of paying and non-paying participants.  As the Kentucky Attorney Gen-
eral noted above, a flexible entry sweepstakes must provide entries on an
“equal” basis to non-paying participants to negate consideration.139  The con-
cept of “equal dignity” to validate a free method of entry in a flexible participa-
tion sweepstakes has been shaped by case law in regard to (i) method of entry,
(ii) opportunity to win, (iii) claiming prizes, and (iv) prizes awarded.140
A. Method of Entry
Equal opportunity to enter requires that the entry mechanism for non-pay-
ing participants be substantially similar to those of paying participants.  As an
example, in Commonwealth v. Frate, the court addressed the conviction of an
individual who set up a device whereby a person could insert a coin and win a
prize, but also could receive a chance to win a prize without making a purchase
by mailing in a stamped, self-addressed envelope, and a 3x5 card with his name
and address printed on it.141 Frate involved a “cumbersome requirement to
request free play by mail, rather than immediately on the site of the game
machine itself . . . [it] pose[d] a significant practical disadvantage to a player
wishing to play for free as compared to a paying player.”142  What is an unrea-
sonably burdensome method of free entry is a question of fact.143
being confused by the ‘no purchase necessary’ aspect.” Id.  In the end, the court found the
grocery store’s scheme constituted an illegal lottery because some people made purchases in
addition to receiving their free game pieces. Id.  In this way, they supplied “pecuniary con-
sideration for all the chances in bulk.” Id.
Although the Simple Contract Consideration Test and Promoter Benefit Test both tend
to reject flexible entry sweepstakes, this case presents a clear example of the differences
between the two.  Under a simple contract theory approach, a court most likely would have
rejected the entry as not really “free.”  By requiring participants to visit the store to receive a
game piece, the scheme’s operator is bargaining for the chance to sell more goods.   Accord-
ingly, consideration still is present. Id.  As Boyd v. Piggly Wiggle Southern, Inc., demon-
strates, however, the Promoter Benefit Test rejects any flexible entry sweepstakes, whether
truly free or not, as long as any participant provides a benefit to the scheme operator. Id.
138 Cabot & Csoka, supra note 2, at 239.
139 Ky. Op. Att’y Gen., 81-259, 2-799, 2-801 (1981).
140 See generally Cabot & Csoka, supra note 2, at 238-39.
141 Commonwealth v. Frate, 537 N.E.2d 1235, 1235-36 & n.1 (Mass. 1989).
142 Commonwealth v. Webb, 860 N.E.2d 967, 971 n.11 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (citing
Frate, 537 N.E.2d at 1235-36).
143 In G.A. Carney, Ltd. v. Brzeczek, 453 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983), the court sug-
gested that consideration is absent where the chance to win is free, even if some participants
win by making a purchase, if Illinois’ interpretation of the Equal-Dignity Rule is honored.
Id. at 761.  This case, however, concluded that the existence of a free entry form is not
dispositive and that a free entry should not be illusory.  The court concluded “the obstacles
to obtaining a free entry blank are so formidable, the publisher’s offer of a free entry blank
must be regarded as chimerical.” Id.  The G.A. Carney, Ltd. court went on to indicate that
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Central to the notion of equal opportunity to enter is that the public knows
and understands that no purchase is necessary and knows how to enter the
sweepstakes.  This typically is reflected in disclosure requirements.  For exam-
ple, disclosure of the free method of entry must be “clear and conspicuous,” so
that consumers are adequately informed of the existence of a non-purchase
method of entry.  This began as a matter of common law.144  For example, in
Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chen, Walsh, & Tecler, even a game
with a free entry option may be deemed a lottery if the promoter fails to widely
publicize the availability of free entries, or if non-paying participants do not
compete on terms equal to purchasing participants.145  In another instance, the
Kentucky Attorney General evaluated a promotional game offered by McDon-
ald’s.146  The Kentucky Attorney General noted that the game likely was legal
as it offered a free entry, but recognized that the alternative must be readily
available as well.147  Moreover, the opinion cautioned that:
any advertisement of “no purchase necessary”, without more, would in this situation
be unfair and misleading by failure to disclose the other alternatives for obtaining
sweepstakes tickets and participating in this scheme.  Therefore, any advertisement
of such a scheme must include all of the alternatives for participation in the
scheme.148
More typically today, the requirement of adequate disclosure is required
by statutes governing sweepstakes.  For instance, the California Business and
Professions Code requires that for all solicitation materials containing or
describing a sweepstakes, a no-purchase-or-payment-necessary statement must
be provided in the official rules included in the solicitation materials or on the
entry-order device.149  Illinois necessitates that written prize promotions must
include the following disclosures:
(1) A purchase will not improve a person’s chances of winning;
(2) Any requirement that person pay the actual shipping or handling fees or any other
charge to obtain prize including amount and nature of charge.
(3) Any restrictions on receipt of prize; and
(4) Any limitations on eligibility.150
“we do not inquire into the theoretical possibilities of the scheme, but . . . examine it in
actual practical operation.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
144 See generally F.A.C.E. Trading, Inc. v. Todd, 903 A.2d 348, 353-54 (Md. 2006) (citing
Mid-Atl. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chen, Walsh, & Tecler, 460 A.2d 44, 46 (Md. 1983).
145 Mid-Atl. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 460 A.2d at 46.
146 2 Ky. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 81-259 (July 14, 1981).
147 Id. at 2-801, 2-802.
148 Id. at 2-802.  The Kentucky Attorney General has stated that a contest is not gambling
when the promoter offers an alternative for participants to obtain chances free and on a
reasonably equal basis. See, e.g., id.at 2-801; 2 Ky. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 81-146, 2-700 (Apr.
14, 1981); Ky. Op. Att’y Gen. 76-6, 1976 (no consideration exists where participants can
choose to enter for free).
149 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17539.15(b) (West 2009).
150 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/25-4, 6-8 (West 2009); see also IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 714B.2(2) (West 2009). “A written prize notice must contain each of the following:
a. The true name or names of the sponsor and the street address of the sponsor’s actual principal
place of business.
b. The retail value of each prize the person receiving the notice has been selected to receive or
may be eligible to receive.
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These statutes represent a legal shift towards stricter regulations in “no
purchase necessary” disclaimers, as evinced by a recent settlement between the
New York Attorney General and Tylenol regarding inadequate disclosures.151
c. A statement of the odds the person has of receiving each prize identified in the notice.
d. Any requirement that the person pay shipping or handling fees, or any other charges to obtain
or use a prize, including the nature and amount of the charge.
e. A statement that a restriction applies and a description of the restriction, if receipt of the prize
is subject to a restriction.
f. Any limitations on eligibility to receive a prize.
g. If a sponsor represents that a person is a winner or finalist, has been specially selected, is in
first place, or is otherwise among a limited group of persons with an enhanced likelihood of
receiving a prize; or that a person is entering a contest, sweepstakes, drawing, or other competi-
tive enterprise from which a single winner or select group of winners will receive a prize, and if
the notice is not prohibited under section 714B.3, subsection 1, paragraph “c”, a statement of the
maximum number of persons in the group or purported group with this enhanced likelihood of
receiving a prize.
h. Any requirement or invitation for the person to view, hear, or attend a sales presentation in
order to claim a prize, a good faith estimate of the length of the sales presentation, a description
of the merchandise that is the subject of the sales presentation, and the total cost of such
merchandise.”
As evinced by a recent New York Attorney general settlement with Tylenol regarding inade-
quate disclosures, these statutes also are being strictly enforced. See, e.g., Press Release,
N.Y. State Att’y Gen., Tylenol Manufacturer To Amend Sweepstakes Ads (Sept. 10, 2004),
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2004/sep/sep10a_04.html.  In 2004,
New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer announced a settlement with the maker of
Tylenol, McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharmaceuticals, in regards to its “Survivor All-
Stars-Tylenol Push Through the Pain Game” sweepstakes promotion. Id.  According to the
Attorney General’s Office, the advertisements for the sweepstakes made it appear that a
purchase of Tylenol was required to enter. Id.  The printed advertisements contained: large
bold print, indicating that to enter consumers should “Buy Tylenol”; and, while there was a
non-purchase entry, the statement “No purchase necessary” was only disclosed in the dis-
claimer at the bottom of the print advertisements.  In addition to this, the voice-overs for the
television advertisements for the promotion stated: “For your chance to win just buy any
Tylenol product,” and the visual on the screen instructed consumers to buy a Tylenol product
to enter the sweepstakes. Id.  Similarly, the words “No purchase necessary” were only
placed in the legal disclaimer at the bottom of the screen at the end of the advertisement. Id.
This settlement resulted in Tylenol paying $52,000 in civil penalties and costs. Id.
Furthermore, McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharmaceuticals agreed to: (1) “not make any
express or implied representation in its advertisements that a consumer must purchase a
product in order to enter a sweepstakes[ ] [or that] a consumer will have a greater chance of
winning a sweepstakes if they purchase a product;” (2) “clearly and conspicuously disclose
in its advertisements that no purchase is necessary to enter a sweepstakes;” and (3) “clearly
and conspicuously and with equal prominence to the language that refers to the product
purchase, disclose the availability of” non-purchase entries “in any [ads] which refer[ ] to the
purchase of a product as a means of entering a sweepstakes.” Id.  The Tylenol action
required that non-purchase entries be displayed with “equal prominence” to any purchase
method of entry. Id.  However, it would appear that that the “equal prominence” require-
ment was only remedial in nature.  The current standard that non-purchase entries be dis-
closed in a “clear and conspicuous” manner has not changed.
151 Press Release, N.Y. State Att’y Gen., Tylenol Manufacturer To Amend Sweepstakes
Ads (Sept. 10, 2004), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2004/ sep/
sep10a_04.html.
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B. Opportunity to Win
A second concept of Equal Dignity is that non-paying participants should
not face greater odds or obstacles to winning the prizes than paying participants
face.  For example, a person who enters by paying cannot get a disproportion-
ate number of entries compared to non-paying entries.  To illustrate this, in
Black North Assocs., Inc. v. Kelly, the appellate division of the Supreme Court
of New York held that a Lucky Shamrock Vending Machine that cost $1 and
dispensed a game piece for prizes between $1 and $500 was a gambling device
even though free promotional game pieces were available upon request at the
bar where the machine was located or by mail, and a sign indicated “no
purchase necessary.”152  Critical to the decision was that the free game piece
was limited to one per person per day, whereas “players . . . could increase their
chances by making multiple purchases.”153  Likewise, in Animal Protection
Soc. v. State, a charity offered a “free bingo” game by which persons buying
items such as combs and candy received bingo cards.154  Others not wanting to
buy such items also were given cards, but those buying items could receive
more “free” cards than those who did not.155  In finding that the scheme vio-
lated state lottery laws, the court noted that the provision for not having to buy
the items to obtain some bingo cards:
alone did not transform the bingo games offered by plaintiffs into “free bingo” since
patrons who obtained the cards without making a purchase received fewer cards than
patrons who did buy the items; thus, it follows that the other patrons had to pay to
obtain a greater number of bingo cards.156
In addition, non-paying participants cannot be forced to qualify for the
rounds in which paying participants can buy entries.  For example, in People v.
Shira, the promoter offered a game called Ringo in a 100-seat theater.157  The
main game was a variation of bingo, a game of chance.158  Two methods
existed to get entry into the main game.159  The first was free and involved
attempting to toss and encircle a single red ring over a peg.160  The second way
was to buy your way into the bingo game by either buying additional rings to
attempt to encircle a peg or simply buy a direct entry into the bingo game.161
This violated lottery laws because “[t]he chance to win the prize [was] not open
to any person without the payment of consideration.  The vast majority of the
players (88 percent) who [could not] successfully toss the small rings over the
peg [had to] pay a valuable consideration (25 cents) for a chance to win the
prize.”162  The court contrasted this from legal promotions in which “there was
a general and indiscriminate system of distribution of the drawing tickets and
152 Black N. Assocs., Inc. v. Kelly, 722 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667-68 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
153 Id. at 667.
154 Animal Prot. Soc’y of Durham, Inc. v. State, 382 S.E.2d 801, 802-3 (N.C. Ct. App.
1989).
155 Id. at 807.
156 Id. at 807-08.
157 People v. Shira, 133 Cal.Rptr. 94, 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
158 Id. at 97.
159 Id. at 95-96.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 103, 106 (emphasis in original).
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the money paid by the patrons for the admission ticket to the theater or for
gasoline was no more than consideration for viewing the movie or for the gaso-
line itself.”163
Differing deadline dates for paying and non-paying participants also may
be inconsistent with equal treatment of paying and non-paying participants.164
C. Claiming Prizes
While paying and non-paying participants must have equal opportunity to
enter, a third concept of the Equal Dignity Rule is that non-paying customers
cannot be disadvantaged in claiming their prizes.  This is particularly acute
where the opportunity to win the prize pools for free entries is more difficult.
For example, in Supreme Judicial Court of Mass. v. Wall, the court found a
sweepstakes at a movie theater to be an unlawful lottery, despite the fact that
free entries were given away to non-paying participants because of the diffi-
culty non-paying participants had in redeeming winning tickets.165  Specifi-
cally, a participant who had paid the admission to the performance had the
advantage of immediate presence in the theater where the drawing was taking
place.166  “He could hear the number and the name read [and] [h]e could iden-
tify himself at once.”167  In contrast, non-paying participants had to wait
outside the theater in relative discomfort for the drawing to occur and hope that
they could navigate the crowd to claim the prize in the time allotted.168
D.  Prizes Awarded
The final concept of the Equal Dignity Rule is that non-paying participants
should have equal chances to win all prizes offered.  For example, separate
prize pools may invalidate the flexible entry sweepstakes because the non-pay-
ing participants do not have the opportunity to win the same prizes as paying
participants.
In Classic Oldsmobile-Cadillac-GMC Truck, Inc. v. State, the court
examined a promotion whereby “any person who enter[ed] into a lease arrange-
ment for a new vehicle . . . during a specified four-week period would automat-
ically have twelve monthly lease payments paid by plaintiffs, if the temperature
equaled or exceeded ninety-six degrees [F]ahrenheit at the Portland Interna-
tional Jetport on a subsequent date.”169  Alternatively, “any person, without
purchasing or leasing any vehicle, could submit [his/her] name for a drawing
during the same four-week period and the winner of the drawing would be
eligible to receive the sum of $5,000 if the temperature reached ninety-six
degrees.”170  Specifically, the court “found that the plan involved two promo-
163 Id. at 103 (citing Cal. Gasoline Retailers v. Regal Petrol. Corp. of Fresno, 330 P.2d 778
(Cal. 1958); People v. Carpenter, 297 P.2d 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956); People v. Cardas, 28
P.2d 99 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1933)).
164 See generally Alaska Op. Att’y Gen. No. 663-93-0004 (Sept. 2, 1992).
165 Commonwealth v. Wall, 3 N.E.2d 28, 30 (Mass. 1936).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Classic Oldsmobile-Cadillac-GMC Truck, Inc. v. State, 704 A.2d 333, 333 (Me. 1997).
170 Id. at 334.
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tions—one for those who enter[ed] into a lease agreement and one for those
who d[id] not.”171  As a consequence, while “[e]very lessee [would] win the
lease payments if the temperature [was] reached, . . . the other entrants [would
have to] participate in a drawing in which only one [would] win.172  The court
held, therefore, that the promotion constituted an unlawful game of chance.173
VI. CURRENT AMBIGUITIES
A. Flexible Entry Sweepstakes
1. Current Issues
Over the years, various promoters have attempted to use the free entry
exception to devise schemes that prosecutors often describe as “a thinly veiled
lottery.”174  The concept of these promotions is relatively simple: to offer a
lottery-like product but offer a free method of entry to evade the lottery prohi-
bition.175  The most litigated scheme was the “Lucky Shamrock.”  In the late
1990s and through the first decade of the 2000s, several court and attorney
general opinions addressed the “Lucky Shamrock” phone card sweepstakes and
mechanical dispensers.176  The Lucky Shamrock emergency phone card was a
one- or two-minute long-distance phone card, which also had a sweepstakes
entry attached to the card.177  The Lucky Shamrock emergency phone card
machines dispensed cards with a pull-tab sweepstakes entry and electronically
displayed the sweepstakes results from that card.178  Although the purchase of a
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 335.
174 See Bohrer v. City of Milwaukee, 635 N.W.2d 816, 819 (Wis. Ct. App.2001).
175 See id. at 818.
176 See Miss. Gaming Comm’n v. Six Elec. Video Gambling Devices, 792 So.2d 321 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2001); Black N. Assocs., Inc. v. Kelly, 722 N.Y.S.2d 666 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001);
Midwestern Enters., Inc. v. Stenehjem, 625 N.W.2d 234 (N.D. 2001) (discussing Lucky
Strike phone card dispensing device); Freedom Concepts, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control
Comm’n, No. 02AP-913, 2003 WL 22054059 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2003); Ohio State Div.
of Pub. Safety v. Draco Ltd., PLL, No. 02AP-1290, 2003 WL 21652178 (Ohio Ct. App. July
15, 2003); Katmandu, Inc. v. Liquor Control Comm’n, No. 02AP-546, 2002 WL 31750261
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2002); Diamond Game Enters. v. Howland, No. CV-98-1242-ST,
1999 WL 397743 (D. Or. Mar. 23, 1999); Sun Light Prepaid Phonecard Co. v. State, 600
S.E.2d 61 (S.C. 2004);  F & H Invs. v. State, 55 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. App. 2001); Alaska Op.
Att’y Gen. No. 663-00-0212 (Oct. 17, 2000); Ill. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 98-010 (July 13, 1998);
Kan. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 97-26 (Mar. 17, 1997); La. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 98-476 (1998); La.
Op. Att’y Gen. No. 98-142 (June 25, 1998); S.C. Op. Att’y Gen., 2000 WL 356794 (Feb. 29,
2000); Tex. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 97-008 (Feb. 20, 1997).  Only the Kansas Attorney General
provided an opinion that the sweepstakes was likely to be legal because the contest would
lack consideration if the entry was free, not overly burdensome and offered an equal chance
of winning to non-paying contestants. See Kan. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 97-26 (Mar. 17, 1997).
177 Black N. Assocs., Inc. v. Kelly, 722 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
178 Compare id. (The unique feature of the machine is that it scans a bar code on each pull-
tab that it dispenses), with Miss. Gaming Comm’n, 792 So.2d at 323 (“For one dollar, the
Lucky Shamrock dispenses a two minute emergency long distance calling card, good only
for one call no matter the time actually used.  With each card, the purchaser also receives a
game piece.  This has a bar code on the back which is read by the machine as the card is
being dispensed.  The display on the machine then simulates a slot machine by spinning nine
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phone card from a dispenser was the primary method for participating in the
Lucky Shamrock sweepstakes, it was not the sole method.179  The Lucky
Shamrock sweepstakes also offered an alternative free method of entry.180  A
person could enter the sweepstakes by obtaining a free game piece from a par-
ticipating retail store or through the mail from a Lucky Shamrock
distributor.181
Courts and attorneys general in several states looked at the Lucky Sham-
rock promotion and dispenser with regard to whether such sweepstakes and
dispensers violated criminal gambling laws in their states.182  Only the Kansas
Attorney General provided an opinion that the sweepstakes was likely to be
legal because the contest would lack consideration if:  the alternative method of
entry was free, not overly burdensome, and offered an equal chance of winning
to non-paying contestants.183
In the other instances, the free entry was held to be ineffective or likely to
be ineffective.184  The Illinois Attorney General provides a good example:
“although the scheme has been carefully designed to appear to meet the criteria
generally prescribed by the courts in approving giveaway schemes, a review of
the underlying purpose of the scheme leads inexorably to the conclusion that
the Lucky Shamrock sweepstakes is but a thinly veiled lottery.”185  In other
words, even though the Lucky Shamrock sweepstakes was designed to avoid
the consideration element by using a free entry in a manner consistent with
court opinions in Illinois, the Illinois Attorney General still felt it was an illegal
gambling game.186
squares.  After a few moments the display shows the same combination of squares as on the
game piece.  Again simulating a slot machine, the machine lights up and plays music if the
patron is a winner.  A cashier at the store verifies the winning card.  This clerk then pays the
prize money that can be in the amount of one dollar up to five hundred dollars.”).
179 See generally Black, 722 N.Y.S.2d 666; Midwestern, 625 N.W.2d 234 (referring to
“Lucky Strike” phone card dispensers, a set-up similar to “Lucky Shamrock” phone card
dispensers); Diamond, 1999 WL 397743; Sun Light, 600 S.E.2d 61; Alaska Op. Att’y Gen.
No. 663-00-0212 (Oct. 17, 2000); Ill. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 98-010 (July 13, 1998); Kan. Op.
Att’y Gen. No. 97-26 (Mar. 17, 1997); Tex. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 97-008 (Feb. 20, 1997).
Only the Kansas Attorney General provided an opinion that the sweepstakes was likely to be
legal because the contest would lack consideration if the entry was free, not overly burden-
some and offered an equal chance of winning to non-paying contestants. See Kan. Op. Att’y
Gen. No. 97-26 (Mar. 17, 1997).
180 See supra note 179.
181 Id.
182 See generally Miss. Gaming, 792 So.2d 321; Black, 722 N.Y.S2d 666; Midwestern, 625
N.W.2d 234 (referring to “Lucky Strike” phone card dispensers, a set-up similar to “Lucky
Shamrock” phone card dispensers); Freedom, 2003 WL 22054059; Katmandu, 2002 WL
31750261; Diamond, 1999 WL 397743; Sun Light, 600 S.E.2d 61; Alaska Op. Att’y Gen.
No. 663-00-0212 (Oct. 17, 2000); Ill. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 98-010 (July 13, 1998); Kan. Op.
Att’y Gen. No. 97-26 (Mar. 17, 1997); La. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 98-142 (June 25, 1998); S.C.
Op. Att’y Gen., 2000 WL 356794 (Feb. 29, 2000); Tex. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 97-008 (Feb. 20,
1997).
183 See Kan. Op. Att’y. Gen. No. 97-26 (Mar. 17, 1997).
184 See, e.g., Ill. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 98-010 (July 13, 1998); Miss. Gaming, 792 So.2d 321;
Black, 722 N.Y.S.2d 666.
185 Ill. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 98-010, supra note 185, at 6-7.
186 Id.
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2. Deviation From Economic Value Test
This deviation from the prevailing Economic Value Test has been justified
on three different grounds.
a. Primary Versus Incidental
A consideration by a small number of courts is whether the sweepstakes
was the promoter’s primary business or incidental to promoting another busi-
ness.  In F.A.C.E. Trading, Inc. v. Carter, the Indiana Court of Appeals con-
cluded that an “Ad-Tab” game was an illegal gambling machine.187  The court
went on to distinguish legal promotional contests:
A distinction exists between promotion of a primary business of selling a meal or a
drink for valuable consideration together with a chance to win a business related
prize, in kind or, albeit, as a sweepstakes prize which attracts sales, and promotion of
a non-primary business related and incidental activity for valuable consideration
together with a chance to win a prize unrelated to either the primary business activity
or attraction of sales.  The difference in the distinction is in the essence of the prod-
uct: [t]he former promotes sales of the primary business product, e.g., food, while the
latter promotes the prize and the product (coupon) is unrelated to either the primary
business purpose of the promoter, of the distributor, or of [F.A.C.E.].  The court fails
to discern any claim that [ ] [F.A.C.E.] is engaged in the primary business of market-
ing for the businesses which advertise in the Ad-Tabs, or that [F.A.C.E.]’s primary
source of revenue is from those businesses as opposed to the sale of Ad-Tabs.188
In F.A.C.E. Trading, Inc. v. Todd, the court held that gambling occurs
where the purchase of a game card was primary and not incidental to the
purchase of the product.189  In F.A.C.E. Trading, a customer at a pizza restau-
rant could purchase an Ad-Tab, which is a paper ticket, from a machine for
$1.190  The coupon on the Ad-Tabs provided customer discounts from between
$5 to $30.191  The Ad-Tabs also offered the customers a chance to win a cash
prize.192  A customer also could receive a paper ticket for a chance to win a
cash prize with no purchase necessary, either by calling a toll-free number or
by filling out a mail-in card from the side of the machine.193  F.A.C.E. argued
that because the value of the coupons exceeded the $1 purchase price by at least
five times and because there was a free alternative, there was no considera-
tion.194  The court disagreed and concluded that, unlike the Mid-Atlantic Coca-
Cola case (where the court explained that there was no consideration for the
chance to win the cash prize, but rather, the consideration there was spent to
buy the drink), the Ad-Tab machine was a “mere guise under which a gambling
transaction may be conducted.”195
The court explained that a free entry may not always be effective:
187 F.A.C.E. Trading, Inc. v. Carter, 821 N.E. 2d 38, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
188 Id. at 43.
189 F.A.C.E. Trading, Inc. v. Todd, 903 A.2d 348, 354 (Md. 2006).
190 Id. at 349.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 350.
194 Id. at 352.
195 Id. at 359 (quoting Stewart v. Schall, 4 A. 399, 401 (Md. 1886)).
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Except for the minor “free entry” aspect of both cases, the case at bar is significantly
different from Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola.  In Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola, every pur-
chaser, upon paying for a bottle of the soft drink at a retail establishment, received
the consumer product at its normal price.  The purchaser could not, at the retail estab-
lishment, pay to obtain just bottle caps for the purpose of trying to win cash prizes.
Instead, the purchaser could obtain a bottle cap from the retailer only if he or she
bought the bottle of soft drink at its usual price.  The cash prize, represented by a
winning bottle cap, was a bonus accompanying a small percentage of the bottles of
soft drink sold.  There was no consideration given for the chance to win a cash prize.
Furthermore, there was no indication in the Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola case that per-
sons were purchasing bottles of soft drink from establishments, and throwing away
the soft drink, because their principal interest was to gamble and try to win cash
prizes shown on a few bottle caps.  The essence of the transaction in Mid-Atlantic
Coca-Cola was the purchase of a bottle of soft drink at its regular price.  The chance
to win a cash prize was clearly incidental.
In contrast, the essence of the Ad-Tab coupon card game was the purchase of
pull-tab cards giving the purchaser the chance to win a cash prize.  F.A.C.E. Trad-
ing’s own evidence showed that only 1% of the Sports Bar Clothing coupon cards,
1.8% of the Zippo coupon cards, and 15% of the Dart World coupon cards, were
redeemed for products.  Between 85% and 99% of the persons buying these coupon
cards were apparently interested only in gambling for cash.196
In short “[u]nlike the situation in Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola . . . , the Ad-
Tab game of chance is not incidental to the purchase of products.  Instead, as
the Circuit Court held, the product discount aspect of the operation is merely
incidental to the game of chance.”197
196 Id. at 358.
197 Id. at 354.  In Sniezek and F.A.C.E. Trading, Inc., v. Colo. Dep’t of Rev., the court
suggested that for true promotional activities where the scheme is directed to the primary
business of its promoter, a free entry can eliminate the element of consideration.  113 P.3d
1280, 1283 (Colo. App. 2005).  In this case, the Colorado Court of Appeals analyzed
whether a machine manufactured by F.A.C.E Trading, Inc. that dispensed “Ad-Tabs” was an
illegal gambling machine. Id. at 1281.  The owner of a bar purchased and installed the Ad-
Tab machine in her bar. Id.  The machines were later seized as illegal gambling devices. Id.
A customer could purchase an Ad-Tab, which is a paper ticket, from the machine for one
dollar or by requesting a tab by mail for free from F.A.C.E. Id.  The paper tickets contained
tabs that, when removed, revealed various combinations of symbols which resulted in differ-
ing levels of prizes ranging from $1 to $500. Id.  Beside the tabs and prizes, the tickets
contained ads for discounts on certain merchandise. Id.  This merchandise, however, was
not displayed anywhere on or near the machine and it was impossible for the customer to
know in advance, what merchandise would be on the coupon. Id. at 1282.  Also, the signs
on the machine more prominently advertised the chance to win money than the chance to get
discounts on merchandise. Id.
The court explained that gambling requires three elements: (1) the risking of money or a
thing of value, (2) for gain, and (3) is contingent in whole or in part on chance. Id. The first
element, while not labeled as such, corresponds to the “consideration” element and is what
this case turned on.  The court concluded that the availability of a free game piece by mail
did not eliminate the element of risk. Id. at 1282.  This conclusion was based on a very old
case, Cross v. People, 32 P. 821, 822 (Colo. 1893), where defendants “were in the . . .
business of selling shoes and distributed business cards advertising the[ir] shoe store and
providing a chance to win a prize.” Sniezek, 113 P.3d at 1283.  In the Cross case, “the court
acknowledged that a chance to win could be obtained independent of a purchase and that
such a procedure negated the element of risk.” Id.
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b. Inflated Value of Products Sold198
Sweepstakes promoters often try to emulate retail promotions by offering
the purchase of goods or services as the primary method of obtaining entry into
a flexible entry sweepstakes and allowing an alternative free method of entry.
In this way, the flexible entry sweepstakes more closely emulates the typical
retail promotion.  In several cases, the courts have focused on the value or cost
of the item being sold.199  This has bred new standards in some states where
law enforcement and the courts focus on comparing the price charged to the
market value of the goods or services sold.200  As the Arkansas Attorney Gen-
eral noted:  “[i]n making a determination of whether a particular activity is an
illegal lottery, a court will likely look at the actual cost of the product being
offered on the market compared to the price charged for this product or service
with an attendant game piece or chance to win a prize.”201
As an example, in Lindey v. Pennsylvania State Police, Bureau of Liquor
Control Enforcement, a trial court addressed whether the seizure of various Ad-
Tab machines manufactured by F.A.C.E. was unlawful.202  The trial court
noted that a similar scheme had been upheld in a North Carolina decision.203
However, the trial court distinguished that case, concluding that “the record
supports a finding that the coupons are a subterfuge for the gambling
device.”204  The court found particularly relevant the fact that the coupons were
thrown away and could not be returned for repayment of the purchase price.205
The court in Sniezek, however, concluded that F.A.C.E was not engaged in the business
of selling a product or even advertising and that such a distinction was significant. Id.  In
fact, this court flatly rejected the argument that the tab cards machines were like the well-
known McDonald’s promotion where McDonald’s promoted its primary commercial activity
by offering a meal coupled with a chance to win a prize. Id.  Instead, the court noted that the
tab cards at issue in this case did not promote the business of either Sniezek, the bar owner,
or F.A.C.E. Id.  As such, the availability of a free tab card did not negate the element of
risk. Id. at 1282.
198 See Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. 2004-357 (Mar. 9, 2005).  The Opinion found that that amateur
poker leagues did not violate anti-gambling or anti-lottery statutes where no entry fee was
required, registration was for free, poker chips were distributed equally among players, and
no wager of any item of value during the games was permitted. Id.  However, it also
recognized that indirect methods of payment such as annual fees or inflated prices for food
or beverages could meet the consideration requirement. Id.
199 Mid-Atl. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chen, Walsh & Tecler, 460 A.2d 44, 48 (Md. 1983)
(“[W]here, as here, the price for the purchase of the appellant’s product is constant before,
during and at the termination of the promotion, the fact that some of its purchasers (or non-
purchasers) may receive a prize awarded on the basis of chance does not violate the provi-
sions of the Constitution . . .); see also Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 93-364 (Dec. 3, 1993)
(stating that despite receiving a product or item, the participants were actually paying a
premium for the opportunity to receive a prize and the items received were incidental to that
purpose).
200 Mid-Atlantic Bottling Co., 460 A.2d at 48-49.
201 Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. 2006-052 (June 28, 2006).
202 Lindey v. Pa. State Police, Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement, 916 A.2d 703, 704-
05 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).
203 Id. at 705-06 (citing Am. Treasures, Inc. v. State, 617 S.E.2d 346 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)).
204 Id. at 706.
205 Id.
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Also focusing on the question of whether the product has real and inde-
pendent value, in American Treasures, Inc. v. State of North Carolina, the
Court of Appeals concluded that the seller of pre-paid phone cards that
included free promotional game pieces with prizes of up to $50,000 was not an
illegal lottery for two reasons.206  First, the “per minute” price offered by the
card was competitive such that the game piece was not simply a marketing
system but also a valuable commodity.207  Second, a person could receive the
free game piece without purchasing the pre-paid phone card by sending a
request to the seller.208  Indeed, the court found that the price for the phone
cards in that case was “one of the best in the industry.”209
c. Continual Versus Occasional
Finally, some states and courts have looked at whether the flexible entry
sweepstakes is being conducted occasionally or continually.  In Barber v. Jef-
ferson County Racing Ass’n, the Supreme Court of Alabama distinguished the
MegaSweeps promotion at issue from a legally permissible Pepsi-Cola promo-
tion because, unlike the temporary sweepstakes by Pepsi-Cola, “MegaSweeps
is a permanent, high-stakes game.”210  In reaching its decision, the court noted
that “the duration of ‘promotional sweepstakes occasionally offered by fast
food chains, or in connection with candy, sodas, miscellaneous food or other
established retail products,’ is typically ‘limited,’ . . . as opposed to the duration
of the MegaSweeps, which is indefinite.”211  Consequently, the court con-
cluded “it does not follow that simply because low-stakes, temporary promo-
tional sweepstakes with pay-out rates of one-half of one percent that offer free
play are not pursued as lotteries, we must conclude high-stakes, permanent
games with pay-out rates of [ninety-two] percent are immune from the defini-
tion of [gambling] . . . .”212
Accordingly, one state’s solution has been to adopt a promotional sweep-
stakes law.  Under a Minnesota statute, an in-package chance promotion is not
a lottery if (1) one can participate for “free and without purchase of the pack-
age,” (2) the permissible methods of participation are free and a “scheduled
termination date of the promotion” is listed, (3) upon request, retailers are given
entry forms so that customers can participate for free, (4) odds of winning are
not misrepresented, (5) game pieces are randomly distributed and distribution
records are maintained “for at least one year after the termination date of the
promotion,” (6) “prizes are randomly awarded if game pieces are not used” and
(7) the sponsor provides the state with a record of those who were awarded
206 Am. Treasures, Inc., 617 S.E.2d 346, 348-49, 351 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
207 Id. at 351 (noting that the “pre-paid phone card is sufficiently compatible with the price
being charged and has sufficient value and utility to support the conclusion that it, and not
the associated game of chance, is the object being purchased”).
208 Id. at 348, 351 (noting that the free entries indicated that “sale of the product is not a
mere subterfuge to engage in an illegal lottery scheme”).
209 Id. at 351.
210 Barber v. Jefferson County Racing Ass’n, Inc., 960 So.2d 599, 614 (Ala. 2006).
211 Id. at 612 (citing Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 02-089 n.5 (August 21, 2002)) (emphasis in
original).
212 Id. at 614 (quoting Midwestern Enters., Inc. v. Stenehjem, 625 N.W.2d 234, 240 (N.D.
2001)).
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prizes of $100 or more upon request, if such a request is made within one year
of the promotion’s termination date.213  The listing of the scheduled termina-
tion date of the promotion ensures a limited duration promotional giveaway,
thereby preventing a permanent game from attempting to become immune to
the state’s gambling prohibition.
Michigan has codified these various concepts, including, an analysis of
primary versus incidental games, continual versus occasional games, and the
value of the prize.  M.C.L.A. § 750.372(2) provides that the prohibition does
not apply to “a lottery or gift enterprise conducted by a person as a promotional
activity that is clearly occasional and ancillary to the primary business of that
person.”214  A
“promotional activity” means an activity that is calculated to promote a business
enterprise or the sale of its products or services, but does not include a lottery or gift
enterprise involving the payment of money solely for the chance or opportunity to
win a prize[,] a lottery[,] or gift enterprise that may be entered by purchasing a prod-
uct or service for substantially more than its fair market value.215
3. Toward a Comprehensive Policy Regarding Flexible Entry
Sweepstakes
Sweepstakes law in the United States has progressed from a deontological
position, whereby even inciting the gambling instinct was contrary to proper
morals and the law, to a teleological view that focuses on harm to the partici-
pant.  Such progression is reasonable, particularly in light of the prevalence of
legal gambling opportunities in the United States.  Justifying the prohibition
against free or flexible entry sweepstakes because either might incite someone
to actually gamble is a difficult proposition where some form of legal gambling
is available in 48 of the 50 states216 and where the U.S. Supreme Court has
ruled that a legal gambling establishment in one state has a protected Constitu-
tional right to advertise in other states, even where legal gambling may not be
permitted in that state.217
Under the prevailing view, as the very notion of sweepstakes is the
removal of mandatory consideration, financial harm that may befall individuals
participating in such activities must be eliminated to maintain legality.218  This
is easy to understand in the context of entirely free sweepstakes where no one
can or does pay directly or indirectly for the opportunity to win a prize.
213 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.75(1)(b) (2008).
214 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.372(2) (2009).
215 Id.
216 ROGER DUNSTAN, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH BUREAU, GAMBLING IN CALIFORNIA I (1997),
available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/97/03/Chapt1.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2009).
217 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc., v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195-96 (1999).
218 See, e.g., Kimberlianne Podlas, Primetime Crimes:  Are Reality Television Programs
“Illegal Contests” in Violation of Federal Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 141, 157-158
(2007)  (“The law divides prize gaming – activities where a participant attempts to win a
prize – into ‘gambling, sweepstakes, and contests.’  Gambling is a game of chance (where
winning is based on chance and) where an individual pays consideration to participate.  On
the one hand, a sweepstakes, like gambling, is a game of chance.  The participant, however,
does not pay consideration to enter. Hence, a sweepstakes is often called a ‘give-away.’”)
(emphasis in original).
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Flexible entry sweepstakes at least pose the issue of whether those who
pay for the opportunity to win the prize can be financially harmed in the pro-
cess.  In theory, a person encountering the prospect of entering a flexible entry
sweepstakes is faced with three primary options: (1) do not enter the sweep-
stakes, (2) enter the sweepstakes indirectly by buying the product or service or
directly by paying the entry fee, or (3) enter the sweepstakes by using the free
method of entry.  The decision is often made for the participant.  The partici-
pant may have simply stopped in a retail establishment to buy food or goods
and found that the purchase included a sweepstakes entry.  In other circum-
stances, however, the person must make a conscious decision to enter the
sweepstakes by either paying directly or indirectly, or entering for free.
Assuming that a participant acts rationally, the decision between entering for
free versus entry by purchasing the product with the accompanying entry is
effectively convenience versus cost, or, in some cases, whether the person is
going to purchase the product regardless.  When the person is going to purchase
the product regardless, the ensuing benefit of an entry into a sweepstakes cre-
ates no harm.  When the person is not otherwise going to make a purchase or
other direct payment for entry, the decision is whether the inconvenience and
potentially nominal cost (i.e., postage) of the free alternative method of entry
exceeds the direct or indirect payment for entry.  Where the cost to enter is high
and the free method of entry is inconvenient, the person is more likely to
become a paid participant.  Where the cost is high and the person would not
otherwise buy the product, the person is more likely to become a free partici-
pant.  Therefore, a standard rule that flexible entry sweepstakes are lawful pro-
vided that paying and non-paying participants are accorded equal treatment is a
powerful tool against abuse.
Undoubtedly, a rational person given the option between paying for an
entry or a product versus entering for free, all other things being equal, will
choose the free entry unless he is going to buy the product or service any-
way.219  Some jurists and commentators have asserted contrary theories.  One
court asserted that the problem is that those who do pay may do so because of
the embarrassment of asking for a free entry.220  The problem with this hypoth-
esis is that it lacks factual basis upon which to serve as a public policy consid-
eration.  No reports exist to show that persons face financial devastation
because they purchased truckloads of Dr. Pepper or other retail products simply
to gain entry into promotional sweepstakes.
219 See Gerald F. Kaminski, Promotional Games and the Ohio Lottery Laws, 39 U. CIN. L.
REV. 163 (1970).
220 See Pickett, supra note 56, at 1208-209  (“In the dissenting opinion in State v. Danz, the
argument was made that ‘it is not a question of who acquired tickets, but did appellants
cause any one to pay a consideration for any chance such tickets evidenced.’  In other words,
if a person is foolish enough to pay money for a ticket which he could have obtained free, his
folly should not impose responsibility on the defendant.  The weakness of the argument lies
in its assumption that conduct is dictated solely by rational considerations.  Many people,
perhaps laboring under a false sense of delicacy, would prefer to pay for something which
they could have for the asking.  Undoubtedly, the chance of winning a prize induced many
people to purchase tickets of admission to the moving picture theater who would not have
come if the prizes had not been offered” (quoting State v. Danz, 250 P. 37, 41 (1926).).
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Another conservative commentator claimed that promotional sweepstakes
should be banned because of their impact on commercial markets.  “These
effects include . . . raising . . . prices of goods . . . to pay for the prizes being
offered by the game[;] . . . loss of business suffered by competitors solely
because they do not offer promotional games[;] . . . and enticement of the pub-
lic to purchase a product on the basis of the game played rather than on the
merits of the product itself.”221  The fallacy in this argument is that it is an
indictment of advertising in general, of which promotional sweepstakes are a
small part.  For example, celebrity endorsements of products have the same
issues.  Companies pay star athletes considerable sums to endorse their prod-
ucts, and that expense is reflected in the price of the product.  The purpose of
the endorsement is to entice the public to purchase what the celebrity promotes.
This may result in loss of business to companies without celebrity endorse-
ments.  Therefore, it makes no more sense to ban promotional sweepstakes than
to ban many other types of advertisements, both of which are a reality of the
marketplace.
Real concern, however, arises when promoters attempt to create flexible
entry to effectively conduct lotteries where the notion of a free entry is illusion-
ary.  For this reason, courts have rightfully interpreted the lottery prohibitions
as applying to activities where consideration was always present because the
promoters effectively eviscerated the effectiveness of the free entry.  While the
court decisions in the area of equal treatment between paying and non-paying
participants have been largely case specific, certain basic principles have
surfaced.
The Attorney General of Texas stated the proper analysis regarding the
legality of the Lucky Shamrock pre-paid phone card sweepstakes.222  He noted
that the free method of entry could eliminate the element of consideration but
that the free method of entry must be a true free alternative and that several
factors should be examined, including, among other factors:  whether “any
character of favoritism” is shown to participants who paid for the phone-sweep-
stakes card in comparison to those who obtained it for free, and whether the
free cards are in fact readily and conveniently available.223  The overriding
issue, according to the Texas Attorney General, was “whether ‘customers’ and
‘non-customers’ [were] treated equally in every respect.  If any ‘character of
favoritism’ is shown to paying entrants, the scheme is a ‘lottery.’”224
More succinctly, if the concept of equal dignity ever evolved into a rule, it
might be stated as follows: The Equal Dignity Concept requires that paying
and non-paying participants have substantially equal opportunities to enter the
sweepstakes, to win the sweepstakes, to claim prizes, and to win the same
prizes. These standards must be conspicuously displayed in any advertisement
or other announcement.
The rule cannot require exactly equal opportunities simply because cir-
cumstances always occur in which practical differences exist between paying
and non-paying participants.  For example, paying participants in beverage or
221 See Kaminski, supra note 219, at 174.
222 Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 97-008 (Feb. 1997).
223 Id. at 5-6, 9.
224 Id. at 6.
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other package promotions receive the sweepstakes entries by buying the item at
a retail establishment.  Requiring free entries at each retail establishment may
be difficult to implement and control against fraud.  Therefore, the use of mail-
in or internet entries may be justified.  The burden, however, might be shifted
to the promoter to provide legitimate reasons why the method of entry for pay-
ing participants is different than the method for non-paying participants.  A
similar burden should rest on the promoter to justify limitations on the number
of free entries.  If a fast food chain allowed non-paying participants to obtain an
unlimited number of entries into a promotion, then persons might enter
thousands and perhaps millions of times and skew the results of the sweep-
stakes.  Limiting the number of free entries to the same number as the typical
paying customer might receive on a visit would appear reasonable, but the bur-
den should be on the promoter to prove the reasonableness of the restriction.
Once the participation levels are equal for paying and non-paying partici-
pants, the government should have no further interest in the promotion.  Market
forces alone will prevent harm to the individual because if the cost of participa-
tion is any greater than mere nuisance or inconvenience, participants who are
clearly informed of the free option and who can access it on an equal basis will
certainly chose the free method of entry.
Several recent cases have attempted to distinguish between promotional
activities that are incidental to the promoter’s main business and those in which
the promoter is attempting to make money from the promotion itself.  Other
cases have looked at the relative value of the products being sold to determine
the legality of the promotion.  These cases present a form of judicial activism
where the courts have set a new public policy that strays from the existing
policy to protect the public from the economic impact of gambling to punishing
those who would profit from sweepstakes activities through de minimis conve-
nience fees usually included in product pricing.
This approach has three problems.  The first problem is that it attempts to
punish intent as opposed to action.  If a large beverage company decides to
have a promotion where it has hidden codes in its beverage packaging, it would
be legally sufficient.  On the other hand, a promoter that decides to entice per-
sons to buy an overpriced new beverage with a hidden code in its beverage
packaging may be violating the law if the intent was to make money from the
promotion as opposed to promoting a beverage business.  The second problem
is that the analysis strays from the basic underlying public policy to prevent
financial harm to persons from gambling activities.  If a legitimate free alterna-
tive method of entry exists, the public harm is minimized or eliminated and the
intent of the promoter is irrelevant.  The third problem is whether it is readily
provable or significant to the underlying policy whether the promoter intends to
make money through increased sales of an unrelated third product or through
the conduct of the sweepstakes.  In either case, the promoter is intending that
the sweepstakes ultimately result in higher profits.
Another issue is the lack of standards.  When, for example, is a product
worth substantially more than market value?  How do you define market value?
For example, designer clothing is considerably more expensive than clothing
that can be purchased at chain retail stores.  What if the product being sold has
no market value?  This test can turn an ordinary inquiry into whether a promo-
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tion is a legal sweepstakes as opposed to an illegal lottery into a question of
proof more typically reserved to antitrust litigation.225
More importantly, the creation of new exceptions to the Economic Value
Test is unnecessary.  The most recent cases that have reviewed promotions and
determined them to be “thinly veiled lotteries” have or could have been decided
on “equal dignity” grounds.  In many instances, the courts found definitive
examples of violations of equal dignity but otherwise felt compelled to differ-
entiate the activity from permitted retail promotions.  In F.A.C.E. Trading, Inc.
v. Carter, the Indiana Court of Appeals concluded that an Ad-Tab game was an
illegal gambling machine.226  In the case, a customer could purchase an Ad-
Tab, which is a paper ticket, from a machine for $1,227 or, the customer could,
with no purchase necessary, either call a toll-free number or write to F.A.C.E.
and ask for a chance to win a cash prize.228  This “no purchase necessary”
method, F.A.C.E. argued, eliminated the element of consideration.229  The
court disagreed and was influenced by the fact that nowhere was the free alter-
native displayed–not on the Ad-Tab machine nor on posters in the store.230  By
not conspicuously displaying the “no purchase required” option, it violated
equal dignity.
Moreover, in several cases where the promoter had a physical machine
that dispensed chances to win prizes, no explanation was given why the method
of free entry was significantly different than where the person bought coupons
or phone cards.  In these cases, persons buying the coupons could get unlimited
entries at the point of sale, while non-paying customers could not.  This
resulted in a disadvantage to those who did not want to purchase the coupons
and may have been reflected in the fact that virtually no free entries existed in
some cases.  For example, in F.A.C.E. Trading, Inc. v. Dept. of Consumer and
Indus. Svcs., the court noted that more than 2 million Ad-Tabs were being sold
each year in Michigan, but that in three years, only five tabs had been provided
through the free alternate means.231
B. Non-Monetary Consideration
1. Current Issues
In traditional sweepstakes, efforts by participants can include mailing in
an entry form, calling a toll-free number, visiting a store, watching a television
225 Anticompetitive below-cost pricing is illegal under Federal Law.  Predatory pricing
claims are brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 and anticompetitive
predation under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §13(a) (as amended).  Such cases
require proof of sales below market cost. See Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley and Michael
H. Riordan, PREDATORY PRICING: STRATEGIC THEORY AND LEGAL POLICY,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/single_firm/docs/218778.htm#11.
226 F.A.C.E. Trading, Inc. v. Carter, 821 N.E.2d 38, 43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
227 Id. at 40.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 42.
231 F.A.C.E. Trading, Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer & Indus. Servs., 717 N.W.2d 377, 381
(Mich. Ct. App. 2006).
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program, or completing a simple survey.232  Greater expenditures of effort may
include disclosure of proprietary information, filling out credit card applica-
tions, registering for subscription sites, or the like.  A distinguishing feature of
these new sweepstakes is that prospective participants are not asked to com-
plete trivial tasks of no useful benefit to the promoter.
The advent of the internet has brought new twists to older concepts of
promotions.  The interactivity of the internet allows promoters to run sweep-
stakes that can be supported by third-party advertisers and allows promoters to
derive revenues from the sale of information received from participants in the
sweepstakes through questionnaires and data mining.  In these instances, par-
ticipants provide information to the promoter that can be sold to others who
hope to market their products to a certain demographic identified during the
information gathering stage of the sweepstakes.
In addition, sweepstakes and contests requiring user-generated content are
becoming more common.  This is where a participant in the contest needs to
provide some content as a condition of entry such as a drawing or song.  While
some portion of the contest may be judged on skill, winners can be picked
randomly among finalists.  To date, no cases have addressed the legality of
these contests.
Finally, sweepstakes participants can be used to help viral marketing of
internet websites.  For example, a promoter can offer a sweepstakes among
those who refer at least ten paying subscribers/customers to a site.
2. Toward a Comprehensive Policy Regarding Non-Monetary
Consideration
The ABA example that began this article is a good example of a fact
pattern that tests whether substantial non-monetary efforts should be sufficient
to constitute consideration to support an unlawful lottery.  A sense of logic
surrounds the argument that it should be sufficient.  Unlike a de minimis activ-
ity that in itself does not directly benefit the promoter, such as mailing the
entry, the activity requested by the ABA is specifically for the purpose of creat-
ing a valuable set of information that the organization may use for a variety of
commercial purposes.  Other promoters may use sweepstakes for similar pur-
poses, including the creation of powerful and valuable database marketing.  For
sweepstakes requiring the submission of user-generated content, the promoter
may actually be bargaining for content, such as a jingle or slogan, to be
exploited by the promoter for commercial purposes.
The Simple Contract Consideration Test does not distinguish between a
detriment to the participant that is trivial and of no direct use to the promoter
and an act that is specifically bargained for and valuable to the promoter.  A
strong argument exists, however, that the Simple Contract Consideration Test
should recognize such a distinction.  Professor Mark Wessman undertook an
exhaustive review and analysis of when and under what legal basis a player
may enforce the contractual obligations of promoters to honor sweepstakes
232 Ohio deems store visits consideration, while Michigan deems multiple store visits con-
sideration.  California requires additional disclosures when a store visit is required.  Cabot &
Kirk, supra note 10, at 2.
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contracts to pay winnings.233  He asserts that the classical theory of contractual
consideration never maintained that “if a promise was conditional upon any
action of the promisee, no matter how trivial or useless to the promisor, the
consideration requirement was satisfied.”234  Whether the offeror is seeking or
receiving any benefit is irrelevant.  As Wessman notes, “[c]lassical considera-
tion theory clearly recognized the possibility of a conditional gift promise.”235
A gift promise occurs when an offeror sets out a practical requirement as a
condition for receiving a gift; in such a case, the offeror is motivated by gener-
osity, not by fulfillment of a condition.236  For Professor Wessman, a condi-
tional gift promise “seems almost tailor-made for promotional games or
contests in which no purchase or fee is required.”237  Minimal steps to partici-
pate in a game of chance, such as being present or registering, “is of little or no
value” to the offeror.238  Such a requirement “is merely a condition of a gratui-
tous promise.”239  If the Simple Contract Consideration Test had adopted a
view supporting a conditional gift promise, then a court could legitimately dis-
tinguish between trivial and useless acts and substantial or beneficial acts.  In
that case, activities such as the ABA sweepstakes that feature acts beneficial to
the promoter may result in unlawful lotteries, but trivial acts such as mailing in
the entry or being present to win are not.
Under the Economic Value Test, however, the harm that is sought to be
avoided is the impoverishment of the individual. 240  Therefore, unless the indi-
vidual parts with something that makes him or her financially poorer, the
underlying public policy is not compromised.  The notion that the participant
needs to complete a survey (like the ABA promotion required), play a game
while watching advertisements, or undertake a myriad of other activities that
may take some effort or time, does not indicate the impoverishment of the
individual decried by the Economic Value Test.  The government would have a
difficult time prohibiting activities that it conceives as an unproductive use of
its citizen’s time.
Sweepstakes involving user-generated content are more problematic.  The
consideration required under the Economic Value Test must necessarily extend
to non-cash items that have recognized cash value.  Thus, for example, the
requirement that a person “donate” an ounce of gold to be entered into a sweep-
233 See generally Wessman, supra note 40.
234 Id. at 670.
235 Id.
236 Wessman explains this theory using Williston’s famous “tramp hypothetical”:
Suppose, Williston suggested, that a person encounters a tramp on the street and, moved by an
impulse of benevolence, makes the following promise: “If you go around the corner to the cloth-
ing shop there, you may purchase an overcoat on my credit.”   It would be silly to regard the
promise as a bargain, induced by the promisor’s desire that the tramp take a stroll.  The promise
is a gift promise, and the condition recited merely makes it clear to the promisee what he must do
in order to receive delivery of the gift.  Thus, conditional sentence form is not a completely
reliable sign of the presence of a bargain.
Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 671.
239 Id.
240 See Cudd v. Aschenbrenner, 377 P.2d 150, 155 (Or. 1962).
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stakes to win a house would be consideration.  This would include more com-
mon types of noncash items such as virtual-world items that can be bought and
sold with real cash in exchanges.  Consumer-generated content can have eco-
nomic value; for example, a song has value, sometimes substantial value as in
the Beatles’ songbook or even a commercial jingle.  If the promoter is in fact
bargaining for the user-generated content by requesting the transfer of property
rights by virtue of the entry, then a strong argument exists that this is valuable
consideration under the Economic Value Test.  If, on the other hand, the pro-
moter is not receiving any rights in the user-generated content, then it is proba-
bly not consideration under the test.
C. Value as Deriving From Prizes or the Right to Redeem Prizes Given as
the Result of Free Play
1. Current Issues
A more abstract reasoning as to what constitutes consideration is presented
within a Nevada Attorney General opinion that concluded that participants who
pay no initial consideration to play a game may nevertheless pay consideration
if they earn something of value while playing the game and risk such consider-
ation in hopes of greater gain.241  The Nevada Attorney General specifically
opined that, where completely free-play credits are risked “upon the chance or
uncertain occurrence of a winning outcome . . . a wager would exist.”242  Stated
differently, a sweepstake or unlicensed game of chance may be illegal if its
participants may lose play credits for the opportunity to win a prize.
A recent case from Idaho applied similar reasoning. MDS Invs., LLC v.
State illustrates this incongruity between the Economic Value Test and flexible
entry sweepstakes treatment.243  Although Idaho adopted the Economic Value
Test,244 the Idaho Supreme Court recently found a promotional scheme with a
free entry to be illegal.245  Participants in the scheme paid $1 for a sports card
and twenty “free” credits to play a video machine.246  Alternatively, they also
could receive twenty free credits by requesting a voucher through mail, phone,
or an attendant where the game was located.247  As a prize, participants could
request and receive five cents for each credit won beyond their initial twenty
credits.248  However, participants also could risk these credits and continue to
play.249  The court held these additional credits constituted consideration even
though a participant could accumulate them for free by requesting a voucher.250
241 See Nev. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2000-38 (Dec. 29, 2000).
242 Id. at 216.
243 See MDS Invs., LLC v. State, 65 P.3d 197 (Idaho 2003); see also Pre-Paid Solutions v.
City of Little Rock, 34 S.W.3d 360 (Ark. 2001) (considering promotional scheme similar to
the scheme described in MDS Invs., Inc.).
244 MDS Invs., 65 P.3d at 203.
245 Id. at 198.
246 Id. at 203.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 203-04.
249 Id. at 203.
250 Id. at 205.
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2. Toward a Comprehensive Policy Regarding Value as Deriving
From Prizes or the Right to Redeem Prizes Given as the Result of
Free Play
On the one hand, the MDS Investments decision appears to contradict the
policy rationale behind the Economic Value Test.  If a participant can play
without any out-of-pocket expense, then no need exists to protect against the
risk of impoverishment.  On the other hand, a participant essentially wins a
cash prize once the participant wins even a single additional credit.  If the par-
ticipant continues to play with this prize, that person is then playing with
money that could be in his pocket instead of in the video machine.  In this way,
the court’s logic does not conflict with policy.
This reasoning is significant and surprising.  First, it is surprising because
it is unsupported by the usual policy rationale for gambling prohibitions.  Spe-
cifically, if the individual does not part with his or her hard-earned resources, it
is more difficult to justify such an approach.  Second, it is significant because it
further stretches certain features of the minority approach to its unparalleled
extremes.  As between the Idaho case and the Nevada opinion, however, the
Idaho case can be justified, to a great extent, because the players initially parted
with consideration.
VII. CONCLUSION
States are generally free to adopt their own gambling policies.  Among
those who have decided to prohibit some or all forms of gambling, a common
theme is to protect vulnerable persons from being financially harmed or
exploited by gambling.  A critical element to the success of that policy is to
define what is prohibited.  As a consequence, a common definition of gambling
has arisen in the United States that prohibits activities in which a person pays
consideration for the opportunity to win a prize in a game of chance.  This
definition reached a crossroads with promotional marketing involving sweep-
stakes in the mid-twentieth century.  From this, a general consensus arose, that
if a person was not required to pay to enter a prize game, then the activity
would not be considered gambling.  This conclusion is consistent with the pol-
icy only to prohibit those activities that could have financial consequences to
the participants.  For example, public policy should not be concerned with the
prospect that persons will become financially destitute buying hamburgers and
soda simply to enter a game when they otherwise can receive free entries.
A simple rule can guard against potential exploitation of players:  States
can require game organizers to provide free, alternative methods of entry.
Accordingly, courts have long developed reasonable rules to ensure that entre-
preneurs do not distort this notion.  For example, to take advantage of a free
alternative method of entry, disclosure should be “clear and conspicuous” so
that consumers are adequately informed of the existence of a non-purchase
method of entry.  Any material disparity (actual or perceived) between paying
and non-paying entrants can invalidate the free alternate method of entry.
Indeed, non-paying participants must have substantially equal opportunity to
enter, win, and compete for the same prizes.
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Of course, entrepreneurs continue to explore ways to capitalize on the
alternative methods of entry.  Courts should strongly consider not engaging in
judicial activism as a means to justify prohibiting a scheme that they believe is
a veiled attempt to make money from a game of chance.  Instead, these
schemes should be reviewed from the established criteria designed to protect
the public from financial harm by making a simple inquiry into whether a per-
son who does not want to pay has an equal opportunity to enter and win.
Instead, some courts have strayed from this simple and effective analysis by
adopting tests that attempt to distinguish activities based on the intent of the
promoters rather than the action of the class of individuals that the law is
attempting to protect.  As a result, consistency in law and logic in public policy
between states that took 50 years to achieve has been undermined with no
appreciable gain to the public good.
